

What Drives Pakistan's Interest in Afghanistan?

**A Monograph
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Abstract

WHAT DRIVES PAKISTAN'S INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN? by MAJ(P) Christopher L. Budihas, United States Army, 59 pages.

Due to its haphazard partition from British Colonial India and a series of internal and external destabilizing events throughout the last six decades, Pakistan has been plagued with varying degrees of instability that leave it today on the edge of becoming either a failed state or a regional power. This instability has led to a laundry list of detrimental effects, which include increased regional tensions with its neighbors, an Al Qaeda sanctuary, and homegrown terrorism that are contributing to the derailment of the Pakistani central government's rule. Many of the challenges that Pakistan faces are deeply rooted in her relationship with Afghanistan.

To understand Pakistan's complex challenges in this volatile region, an observer must not only analyze Pakistan but also their historical relationship with Afghanistan to intrinsically understand the root causes associated with Pakistani motivations and concerns. Additionally, the causal impacts that other regional nations and sub-national actors have in either providing a positive or negative effect on the natural state of stability between these two nation-states must be incorporated into the analysis. Rarely will any major strategic action from an outside actor directed towards Pakistan not have participative impact on Afghanistan or vice versa.

This monograph provides a deep historical study to determine the contextual facts that have evolved the current environmental dynamics that faces Pakistan. With Pakistan's security, political behavior, and portions of its economy extricably linked with its western neighbor, this research examines what is driving Pakistan's interest in Afghanistan.

The research finds that Pakistan's external and internal security interests, internal political function, and economy are all inter-woven and influence her relationship with Afghanistan. However, based on the research, it uncovers historical events that have generated the current regional dynamics to determine that security is fundamentally driving Pakistan's existential interest in controlling Afghanistan. The analysis concludes that Pakistan sees controlling Afghanistan as a fundamental requirement for ensuring their very existence as a nation-state against an aggressive Indian neighbor and internal militant groups. Additionally, Pakistan recognizes that without enduring security she will not be able to achieve the economic growth she requires to achieve her envisioned destiny of being a global leader within the international community.

Finally, this monograph provides recommendations for future U.S. strategies and finds that failure to understand these complexities analyzed in the research could lead a failed NATO strategy in Afghanistan, a debunked U.S.-Pakistan-Afghan partnership, and worse case, a regional war between the two nuclear states of Pakistan and India. The findings also conclude that for Pakistan to achieve an enduring state of security there must be open and credible strategic dialogue between Afghanistan and NATO to achieve collective diplomatic agreements that deliver a mutually cooperative partnership. In addition to this strategic dialogue, parallel negotiations are recommended with India and Iran that leads to cooperative concessions, if not formal treaties or agreements, to mitigate their negative influences on Pakistan. This would greatly reduce the regional friction between these collective nations, which historically benefits no specific country. By abiding on the agreed terms of their negotiations, it may lead to an unprecedented regional stability and economic prosperity for all involved.

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Introduction

In a recent interview with the *Wall Street Journal*, President Barack Obama stated that Pakistan's border region is "the most dangerous place in the world" as the majority of international terrorist incidents within the year were either planned or launched from Pakistan.¹ Many of these terror plots directly launched against the United States and her allies came from terrorists that were trained by Al Qaeda in the frontier areas of Pakistan. Two prominent attacks that recently captured the U.S. public's attention were the attempted improvised car bomb attack in Times Square by Faisal Shahzad² and Najibullah Zazi's planned bombing in the New York subway system that was thwarted by the FBI.³ With such sober threats to her homeland and a nine-year NATO war in Afghanistan, the United States continues her history of failed foreign policies aimed at creating an effective partnership with Pakistan. This is because of the failure of policymakers to understand the complexities of Pakistan and its intrinsic relationship with Afghanistan.

Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has been plagued with instability due to its haphazard partition from British Colonial India and a series of internal and external destabilizing factors throughout its 63 years of history that leave it today on the edge of becoming either a failed state or a regional power. Many of the challenges that Pakistan had and continues to face in today's complex world are extricably linked to their western neighbor. Pakistan's security, political positioning, and portions of its economy are inter-woven with Afghanistan. To understand Pakistan's challenges, an outsider must not only analyze Pakistan but its relationship with Afghanistan to understand Pakistani motivations and concerns within this volatile region of the world.

¹ Yochi J. Dreazen, "Al Qaeda's Global Base Is Pakistan, Says Petraeus," *Wall Street Journal*, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124182556238902393.html> (accessed September 1, 2010).

² Kimberly Dozier, "U.S. Army Developing Pakistan Attack Plan As Possible Response To Terror Attack," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/29/us-army-developing-pakist_n_594235.html (accessed September 8, 2010).

³ Carrie Johnson and Spencer S. Hsu, "Terrorism Suspect Planned Peroxide Bombs, Officials Say," *Wall Street Journal*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/09/24/AR2009092400332.html> (accessed September 8, 2010).

It is also imperative for the observer to understand the causal impacts that other regional states and sub-national actors have in either providing positive or detrimental effects on the stability in the region. Rarely will any major strategic action from an outside actor, say India or Al Qaeda, directed towards Pakistan not have participative impact on Afghanistan or vice versa.

What drives Pakistan's interest in Afghanistan? This monograph will show that historical events generate the current regional complexity that drives Pakistan's existential interest in controlling Afghanistan in order to ensure their security. Pakistan's security concerns, internal political function, and economic requirements affect her relationship with Afghanistan. Failure by political leaders and strategists to understand these complexities could lead the U.S. into a failed NATO strategy in Afghanistan, a debunked U.S.-Pakistan partnership, and worse case, a regional war between the two nuclear states of Pakistan and India.

Methodology

This monograph will conduct a deep historical case study to determine the contextual information and background data that evolved into the current situation facing Pakistan.⁴ Using the constructivist approach, this research examines the Pakistani view of Afghanistan in order to achieve greater inter-subjective understanding of these nations and determine what courses of action the U.S. should pursue in her relationship with Pakistan.⁵ The four major components that the monograph will address to determine what is driving Pakistan's interest in Afghanistan are internal security complexities, external security challenges, dynamics of internal Pakistani politics, and the quest for economic resources.

This research provides an overview of prominent Pakistani historical events that have influenced its current complex situation. By exploring Pakistan's internal security complexities and their links to neighboring Afghanistan, this monograph will determine what factors are having a destabilizing effect on Pakistan's sovereignty. Analysis will further determine the effects of historical ethnic alliances with the

⁴ Todd Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction, 3rd Edition* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 86-91.

⁵ David Barry, "Artful Inquiry: A Symbolic Constructivist Approach to Social Science Research," *Qualitative Inquiry Journal*, <http://qix.sagepub.com/content/2/4/411.full.pdf+html> (accessed September 9, 2010).

Pashtun tribes and the effects of the two Talibans. Additionally, there will be an examination of the rise in domestic terrorism due to conflict between Islamic fundamentalism and secular policy. This section ends with an examination of the domestic impact of an Al Qaeda sanctuary in Pakistan and the fallout of the war in Afghanistan affecting internal security within Pakistan.

Next, the monograph will discuss the external security challenges Afghanistan poses for Pakistan. There will be a focused examination of the impact of NATO operations in Afghanistan that influence Pakistan's external security. This will lead to an investigation of Pakistan's strategy to protect itself from India by building an Afghanistan-Pakistan alliance that provides Pakistan strategic depth while preventing Indian influence within Afghanistan. Their strategic attempt to deny India access to Afghanistan will prevent military encirclement of Pakistan and not allow India economic exploration of Afghanistan. Following this, the research will present the impacts of Chinese and Iranian influences in Afghanistan.

The narrative will then evaluate Pakistan's interest in Afghanistan as it relates to its internal politics. From there, further analysis consequently determines the effects that are improving or degrading their political relationship with one another. The research then ascertains Pakistan's desire for economic access in Afghanistan. This investigation will determine the relative importance for Pakistan to gain access to Afghan markets and natural resources.

Through greater understanding of Pakistan and the synthesized results of the four components of this monograph, this research determines what critical factors are driving Pakistan's interest in Afghanistan. The comprehensive analysis within this study concludes by providing a series of viable recommendations for future United States policies and strategies that could positively strengthen the U.S. relationship with Pakistan and enable both countries' fights in this era of persistent conflict.

Literature Review

To comprehend Pakistan's existential interest in Afghanistan, it is critical to conceptually understand the variables associated with a state's identity. A state's identity determines what their relationships will be within the global community. A comprehensive appreciation of how nation-states interact occurs when there is an understanding of what elements compose a nation's collective identity,

the lens in which a country self-reflects to determine their interpretation of the international community, and, based on their internal state requirements (security, economic, etc.), what other nations they interdependently rely on or see as a potential adversaries.

Many political scholars evaluate nation-state interaction by using the concepts of norms, identities, and cultures in a sociological analysis approach.⁶ These three concepts complementarily influence one another and when fused together, form the core that defines a state's cumulative identity. An understanding of these three concepts will generally determine how sovereign states will act within the global environment. Norms provide a nation with a set of rules that regulate the expected behavior of its collective society. Whereas identities are the prevailing social variables that make nation-states unique from one another. Culture is then an integrated description of the values, attitude, and behaviors that regulate a nation's standards of conduct. A majority of social and political scientists agree that norms, identity, and culture holistically provide the foundation of a country's general behavior within the international community.⁷

External influences from other countries and internal domestic values and pressures further shape a state's behavior. David Welch reinforces this statement by describing that, "international and domestic environments shape state behavior and how they pursue external relationships" with nations that generally possess the same values and interests in a competitive global community.⁸ These external and internal influences drive a country's self-interest where a nation determines how to survive or thrive in the global community. Examples of external influences on a nation's behavior are the need for security to protect itself from a militarily superior neighbor, the negative impacts of narco-trafficking, or the influences of external religious militancy upon the nation's society. On the other hand, internal influences will provide the internal pressures upon the state's governing structure that will shape its behavior (e.g. national

⁶ Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 5-6.

⁷ Ibid, 5-21.

⁸ David Welch, *Justice and the Genesis of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 211-216.

strategic policies). Robert Keohane further contends that a nation's "self-interested" strategy will institute in a calculative manner to determine the risk of "gains" and "losses" in their foreign policies.⁹ To summarize, a nation's behavior is shaped beyond its foundational roots by the forces of external and internal influences, with an appreciation for the concept of risk versus reward, to choose their international partners.

Todd Landman demonstrates through a review of various scholars' research on international relations and comparative politics, a nation's behavior tempered with their domestic variables and international-level interest will determine their relationship with other countries.¹⁰ Kenneth Waltz reinforces Landman by discussing how the formation of external relationships can be analyzed by reviewing how states cooperate and fall into conflict.¹¹ Mutual security concerns and economic interdependence are two common major areas of mutual interests shared by nation-states. Strong relationships can evolve into formal (written treaties/agreements) or informal (unwritten mutually understood relationship through actions) alliances¹² between two or more nation-states. Knowing the motivations and fallacies associated with alliance building are important in understanding why states behave the way they do within the international community. Many political theorists dispute the fact that alliances are built strictly out of common state identities, specifically ideology. They specifically point out the fact that because two nations are predominantly monarchies and of the same religion does not automatically make them allies.¹³

⁹ David A. Baldwin, *Neorealism and NeoLiberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 285.

¹⁰ Landman, 266-268.

¹¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 12-13.

¹² For the purpose of this literature review, there must be an understanding of what an alliance is between nation-states. Using the interpretation that is set in Peter Katzenstein's book "*The Culture of National Security, Norms and Identity in World Politics*" and the definition of alliance from Oxford's Dictionary, this monograph will use the term to mean: a union or association formed for mutual benefit, especially between countries or organizations; a relationship based on an affinity in interests, nature, or qualities; and a state of being joined or associated.

¹³ Katzenstein, 445-447.

To further understand shared security concerns, Stephen Walt supports this common alliance building motivation through his balance-of-threat theory, where he explains that alliances will form between nations to collectively protect themselves against a perceived threat.¹⁴ Walt states in his theory that the threat is what drives the alliance, not a shared common state identity. An example would be the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, where nations without common state identities formed a coalition to protect the Arabian Peninsula from further invasion and to evict Iraq from Kuwait. There were many Western (U.S., U.K., France, etc) and Middle Eastern (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, U.A.E, etc) countries in this alliance, all with different state identities that united against a common perceived threat (Iraq).

The second major driver of alliance formation is economic interdependence. Like shared security concerns, economic alliances can also form with or without a shared common state identity between nations. An example of an agreement between nations without shared identities is the 2009 Chinese and Sudanese economic agreement.¹⁵ The Chinese requirement for an increase of imported petroleum products, based on her increased domestic industrialization, and the Sudanese requirement for foreign capital to support her nation has led to an economic alliance. The complementary effects of security and economic alliances collectively support all the nations involved and form the majority of international interactions between states.

Even though mutual security and economic concerns generally drive alliances, shared identities between states can also form alliances. Michael Barnett alludes to this fact by stating, “identity provides a handle on who is considered to be a desirable alliance partner” fed by “familiarity.”¹⁶ Generally, nations with vast similarities can attach to one another based on their shared common understanding of

¹⁴ Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.” *International Security Journal* (Spring 1985): 3-34.

¹⁵ Business Monitor International, “CNPC Expands Co-operation With Sudan,” <http://store.businessmonitor.com/article/305910> (accessed September 15, 2010).

¹⁶ Katzenstein, 446.

one another. However, as Michael Barnett and Peter Katzenstein both state, familiarity is a start point but not a requirement for an alliance and that it is secondary to security and economic concerns.¹⁷

The challenges that Pakistan faces in today's complex world are extricably linked to their interaction within the global community. Pakistan's security, political positioning, and portions of its economy are inter-woven with Afghanistan. By now, having a comprehensive understanding of what composes a nation states' collective identity to determine its behavior that feeds how it interacts in the international community, an analysis can be executed to understand Pakistan's existential interest in Afghanistan.

History – The Birth of Plate Tectonic Friction in the Region

To understand the depth of complexity that Pakistan is challenged with through its relationship with Afghanistan and its regional neighbors, there must be an appreciation of this young nation's history. The monograph's historical analysis will begin with the Muslim migration into what is now Pakistan, which will facilitate a thorough comprehensive appreciation of the events that led to today's current issues.

Around 711 CE, Muhammad bin Qasim and his Arab Muslim army from the Middle East moved through Central Asia and established the Umayyad Empire in what is modern Pakistan. Qasim immediately had issues of civil unrest within the empire, specifically pacifying indigenous populations of Punjab and Sindh people. Additionally, their inability to effectively control the influences of the Buddhist and Hindus in this region continued to complicate their ability to control the country.¹⁸ For the next 1,000 years, various Islamic dynasties would attempt to control this portion of modern day Pakistan with varying levels of success.

The land mass of what is currently Afghanistan also fell within these borders during many different Central Asian dynasties, resulting in a fusion of the cultures and histories of the tribes that

¹⁷ Ibid, 26-30.

¹⁸ Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2004), 15-16.

influence today's complex situation in this region. The expansion of Islam in the subcontinent region during this period resulted in isolated Muslim communities being established within what is modern-day India. The cultural differences between Islamic and the Hindu communities resulted in demographic friction that would spark localized violence and periodic wars that continue to exist into the present. In addition, the geographic importance of this region, as the "Silk Highway's" central passage point on the trade routes that connect Europe and the Middle East into Central Asia, made controlling this area financially important for the dynasties ruling this area.¹⁹ However, the complex demographics and challenging geography of this region made it extremely difficult for these sultans to maintain positive control of their entire kingdom. Over the centuries, various empires collectively left their historical impacts and traditions not only on modern day Pakistan, but also on its future relationship with what was to become Afghanistan.

Pakistan's recognized modern history generally begins around 1849, when the British defeated the Sikh Empire during the Anglo-Sikh Wars.²⁰ When the British East India Company ruled over the subcontinent until its independence in 1947, the region included what is now India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. British rulers were immediately confronted with many dynamic challenges associated with the indigenous populations and were challenged to prevent ethnic violence between the kaleidoscope of diverse peoples within their colonial borders.

In 1885, the Indian National Congress (INC) was founded by a number of prominent Indian leaders (both Hindu and Muslim) in a legal attempt to gain more influence in protecting the well-being of the people. The initiation of the INC was the result of perceived injustices and a general lack of effective governance by their British subjugators. At this point in history, an increase in social friction between Hindus and Muslims began to exponentially build, as the Muslims attempted to participate in the INC but were essentially disregarded and pushed to the political sideline. An increase in Muslim nationalism

¹⁹ Larry O. Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001) 159.

²⁰ Stanley Wolpert, *A New History of India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 228-231.

ignited an initiative for prominent Indian Muslims in the government to establish the Indian Muslim League in 1906. In their charter called *The Green Book*, the principles of this organization were outlined by Maulana Mohammad Ali.²¹ The major tenets of the organization were not to “establish an independent Muslim state, but rather concentrating on protecting Muslim liberties and rights, promoting understanding between the Muslim community and other Indians, educating the Muslim Indian community at large on actions of the government, and discouraging violence.”²² However, over the next few decades, due to perceived prejudices by the Hindu majority, lack of government essential services for Muslim communities, and sectarian violence between communities, the Muslim League would evolve as a political movement to gain Muslims an independent nation.

Under recommendation of the Simon Commission in 1927, the British proposed a joint conference between the Indian Muslim League and the Indian National Congress to develop an inclusive constitution for all Indian cultures and religions.²³ However, the conference resulted in both parties not being able to reconcile their differences. This political failure serves as a critical crossroad in both nations’ history, as an irreversible separation between Muslims and Hindus occurred. Through the 1920s and 1930s, Gandhi and other prominent Hindu political leaders set the conditions for a free Indian nation. While running a parallel effort, the Muslim leaders commenced laying the foundation for the creation of an independent Muslim nation. Additionally during this timeframe, leadership within the Muslim League became perpetually disenfranchised with the INC, as Muslim participation in the governmental process dwindled to relative non-existence. Through the 1930s, Muslim separatist organizations increased their calls for an independent Muslim nation. In 1937, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, a major political leader in the Muslim League, future Governor-General of Pakistan and considered by many as the father of Pakistan,

²¹ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 63-73.

²² Academic Dictionaries and Encyclopedias, “The Statesman: The All India Muslim League,” *Government of Pakistan*, <http://www.quaid.gov.pk/politician2.htm> (accessed September 8, 2010).

²³ Wolpert, 326-327.

successfully argues for the British adoption of a “Two-Nation Theory,” that demanded the separation of the Hindu and Muslim lands as two sovereign independent nations.²⁴

As the region entered into World War II, India supported the British against the Axis alliance. Simultaneously, the internal situation within the Indian colony increased with substantial inter-ethnic friction to the point of nearly breaking the country apart.²⁵ In 1944, Ali Jinnah and Gandhi met in Bombay to attempt to mediate a single-state solution where both ethnic groups were equally represented.²⁶ At the conclusion of World War II, “the British have neither the will, the financial resources or military power, any longer” to govern over the Indian subcontinent.²⁷ British Prime Minister Attlee appointed Lord Mountbatten to determine the method of partitioning an independent India and Pakistan. This haphazard division of the countries truly demonstrated the British government’s distressingly flawed knowledge about the complexities of the subcontinent region they had ruled for over half a century. The historical thumbprint the British left on this region, specifically the borders that were drawn, continues to be a central source of friction in today’s complex issues facing Pakistan.

On 14 August 1947, the independent country of Pakistan became a reality. Due to the shortsighted way the country was divided and the inadequate amount of prior preparation before separating Pakistan and India into two nations, there were a number of complicated issues that Pakistan and its leadership were immediately confronted with resolving. First, the governmental framework required to manage the country was not properly established. From the start, Pakistan did not have the typical governmental institutions, economic capital, administrative framework, military, and police forces to set the conditions for the proper administration of the country. Even though the country was generally separated along the “homogeneous” demographics from the “provinces of Punjab and Bengal,” there were a number of tribal and ethnic clashes that resulted from the “mass migration” of two million Muslims into

²⁴ Cohen, 29-31.

²⁵ Wolpert, 346-355.

²⁶ Ibid, 354-355.

²⁷ Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, *A History of India* (New York: Routledge, 1986), 300-312.

Pakistan.²⁸ The inability of the Pakistani leadership to prepare for this mass migration led to decades of inter-ethnic violence among Muslims.

One of the major complicating consequences of the British partition is the division of Pakistan into a West (current day Pakistan) and East (current day Bangladesh). Emboldened by the Pakistani government's inability to effectively rule the geographically separated East Pakistani Bengal nation, a dramatic increase in nationalism awakened a Bengali separatist movement to break away from Western Pakistan and create of an independent state. In 1971, the West Pakistani government and military were unsuccessful in quelling an ensuing Bengali guerrilla movement that India supported by deploying approximately half a million soldiers into East Pakistan. The result was the formation of the independent country of Bangladesh. This embarrassing loss of a large and wealthier portion of Pakistan, not to mention India's direct assistance of the Bangladeshis, continues to be a source of friction between the nations to this day.²⁹

History – Post Independence Afghanistan-Pakistan (AF-PAK) Relations

Post independence, Pakistan's two major strategic goals were to establish friendly relations with its Afghan neighbor and prevent a Kabul-Delhi alliance. Initially, Afghanistan's national leadership had reservations about Pakistan for a number of reasons. Foremost, there was a pervasive perception by many surrounding countries that Pakistan would not be able to survive as a sovereign nation-state within the complex dynamics of this region and the results of a failed Pakistani state would provide a positive opportunity for Afghanistan to seize territory within that land mass. Additionally, if Pakistan became a fully functional democratic country, the Afghan monarchy was afraid its democratic image would generate an internal separatist fervor within the Afghani population to be free of their repressive monarchical rule.³⁰

²⁸ Cohen, 45-51.

²⁹ Ibid, 72-77.

³⁰ Khawar Hussain, *Pakistan's Afghanistan Policy* (Monterrey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School, 2005), 24.

Attempting to take advantage of a juvenile Pakistani state, the Afghans sought to exploit the new Pakistani government's naivety by renouncing the Durand Line, a British invoked Paki-Afghan border agreement, and pursuing the creation of an independent Pashtun nation.³¹ In the case of the Durand Line, based on international law, the Afghans had no legitimate claim to reverse the international agreement and the boundary continues to exist today in that same location, as does the historical controversy surrounding it. As for the question of an independent "Pastunistan," the Pakistan government contends that the Pashtun population's majority vote (the Pashtun people who were living within Pakistani territory and not those Pashtuns in Afghanistan) to be included in the new Islamic Nation of Pakistan was sealed in their choice to be Pakistanis in the 1947 Peshawar Referendum. Additionally, Pakistan specifically balked at Afghanistan's claim for an independent Pastunistan because "Afghanistan's concern for the unity of Pashtuns is not genuine because it does not include the Pashtuns (Pashtunistan) on its side of the line."³² In essence, Afghanistan wanted to give the Pashtuns their own nation at the expense of Pakistan and by not giving up any of its own sovereign territory for this independent Pashtun nation. Throughout the last six decades, these two issues have continued to serve as a source of friction between the leadership of both nations.

Between partition and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the relationship between the two nations fluctuated between a civil friendship and a tenuous peace. Pakistan was primarily focused on a cooperative peace and preventing a "Kabul-Delhi nexus" that would threaten this fledgling country.³³ They envisioned that such an alliance would lead to a two-front war against them, culminating in their ultimate demise and the nation's territory divided between the two neighboring countries. Until 1979, economic, religious, and ethnic similarities between the Afghan-Pakistan neighbors provided a

³¹ Omar Sharifi, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy toward Afghanistan from 1947 – 2008," <http://en.afghanistan.ru/doc/130.html> (accessed on September 10, 2010). The Durand Line was established in 1893, by a treaty signed by the British, Russians and Afghans to provide a buffer zone to preclude Britain and Russia from further expanding their colonial interest in this portion of Central Asia. The Durand Line is a poorly marked and porous international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

³² Ibid.

³³ Khawar Hussain, 9.

cooperative exchange that brought the two nation's relationship increasingly closer together, like brothers.³⁴

The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan dramatically affected the regional dynamics that have shaped Pakistan to what it is today. "The Soviet's interest in Afghanistan dated back to the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty of 1921," where the Russians perceived they had the legitimate right to influence their southern neighbor.³⁵ To illuminate the strategic consequences of the Soviet invasion, ex-Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar explained the situation as:

A Soviet military intervention provoked a deep sense of alarm in Pakistan. Suddenly the buffer disappeared and as the Soviet rulers consolidated their control in Afghanistan, they can use it as a springboard to reach a warm water port on the Arabian Sea [through Pakistan]. Pakistan could not afford to acquiesce in the Soviet intervention, nor could it confront a superpower.³⁶

Due to the invasion, Pakistan faced a number of challenges to ward off a potential communist neighbor. The immediate crisis Pakistan had to contend with was the fact that 3.2 million Afghan refugees were fleeing across the border into their country. This mass exodus produced a crippling financial strain on Pakistan's economy and dramatically changed the internal demographics within the country. Additionally, Pakistan was confronted with the challenge of how to train and resource an Afghan guerrilla movement to extricate the Soviet invaders and their puppet government from Afghanistan. The United States came to Pakistan's assistance with the strategic objective of preventing the creation of a communist Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion became a rallying point to produce a partnership between the United States and Pakistan in an effort to free Afghanistan from communist rule.³⁷ Over the next decade, the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked in support of

³⁴ Ibid, 25.

³⁵ Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban* (Cambridge, MA: De Capo Press, 2002), 221.

³⁶ Abdul Sattar, "Afghanistan: Past, Present and Future, From Jihad to Civil War," *The Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad*, (1997), 462-63.

³⁷ Marvin G. Weinbaun, "Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship," *Asian Survey*, Volume 31, No. 6 (June 1991), 497.

the Pakistani military, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organization,³⁸ and the Pakistani government to train, resource, and fund the Afghan mujahedin. While the goal of evicting the Soviets from Afghanistan was successful, the residual adverse consequences of the war continue to haunt the present regional dynamics.

Some of the major repercussions of the Afghan war included a destabilized central government, an increase in warlordism, a drastic rise in religious militancy, and a major boost in international narco-trafficking, all of which had a residual negative spill-over effect on Pakistan. Within Pakistan, the impact of three million refugees continues to provide a national economic burden, the exponential rise of Islamization and religious militancy, and increased social divisions along ethnic lines, all directly straining Pakistan's government. During this period, there is also an escalating increase in friction between the Pakistani civilian governmental leadership and the military leadership. At the end of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, Pakistan's number one strategic goal was the installation of a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul.³⁹

After the Soviet installed Najibullah Regime fell in 1992, warlordism prevailed in Afghanistan. This anarchical environment in Afghanistan increased and continued to have negative influences on Pakistan. Pakistan recognized that to achieve its strategic goal of a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul, they would have to shift their strategic approach. Over the previous four years, the rise of a Pakistani-friendly Afghani Pashtun Taliban force under the leadership of Mullah Omar appeared to be the logical choice for bringing stability to Afghanistan and providing the strategic alliance Pakistan desired. Pakistan's military and ISI provided the Taliban with the requisite resources and training needed to

³⁸Formally known as the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (also commonly called the ISI), it is Pakistan's leading national independent military intelligence agency. The ISI generally serves the same functions as the U.S.'s Central Intelligence Agency.

³⁹ Khawar Hussain, 44.

subjugate Afghanistan. Additionally, Pakistani religious leaders provided the Taliban with additional resources, money, and recruits through their global Islamic networks.⁴⁰

From 1992 to 2001, the Taliban would militarily struggle against the former Afghani warlords, who would later evolve into the Northern Alliance Coalition. The Taliban's enforcement of strict sharia laws and its brutal treatment of the civilian populace gained it negative international media attention that resulted in increased pressure on countries to not support the Taliban, specifically Pakistan.⁴¹ When the Al Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001 occurred, Pakistan was at a crossroads in their official sponsorship of the Taliban, which was to either disassociate with the Al Qaeda sponsoring organization or to remain supportive to the Taliban and face punishing diplomatic international repercussions. On the surface, Pakistan ceased their support of the Taliban. However, there remains warranted suspicion of Pakistan's unofficial support of the Taliban by providing them a safe haven within its territory.⁴²

Since the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) by NATO forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan's relationship with its neighbor has followed a troubled trajectory that has further complicated its own internal and external security, interjected further dysfunction within its own governmental structure, and strained its economic well-being to the point of nearly causing a catastrophic financial collapse of the nation. As outlined by regional expert Kamal Matinuddin, up until the final days prior to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan's key objectives in Afghanistan had been:

1. The creation of a durable peace with an Afghan government that is pro-Pakistan.
2. The repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistani soil.
3. To gain access into Central Asian markets.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 52-53.

⁴¹ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 75-87.

⁴² Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 44-50.

4. To have a safe route for the oil and gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to the Arabian Sea.⁴³

Currently, Pakistan's failure to achieve these strategically important goals through an enduring Afghanistan partnership results from a number of culminating factors that are interdependently tied with its shared complex historical relationship with its western neighbor.

Internal Security Complexities

Since its partition from India, Pakistan's internal security environment has been complicated. The late summer flooding in 2010 is an excellent example of this complex environment. The central government buckled to its knees from increasing domestic pressure to provide not only critically needed disaster relief services, but also increased internal security as militant groups in the country exploited this tragic situation to gain further influence over the locally affected populations.⁴⁴ With that being said, this section of the monograph will explore the internal security complexities that are destabilizing Pakistan's ability to exercise control within its sovereign borders resulting from neighboring Afghanistan. It will focus on the historical ethnic alliances associated with the Pashtuns and the secondary effects of the two Talibans. The research will discuss the domestic impact of an Al Qaeda sanctuary within Pakistan. It will then explore the rise in domestic terrorism due to conflict between Islamic fundamentalism and secular state policy. Lastly, the monograph will analyze the negative effects of the NATO war in Afghanistan that is affecting internal security within Pakistan.

The Pashtun

The Pashtun are not at peace unless they are at war.
-Pashtun Proverb

⁴³ Kamal Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-1997* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 141.

⁴⁴ Daily Times, "Flood Refugees Threaten Political Stability," http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010%5C09%5C23%5Cstory_23-9-2010_pg7_9 (accessed on September 30, 2010).

The Pashtun tribe is the largest Islamic tribe in the world.⁴⁵ There are an estimated 25 million Pashtuns that geographically straddle the international boundaries between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Making up Afghanistan's ethnic majority, approximately 14 million Pashtuns live in the country and represent 42% of the total population. While not the ethnic majority in Pakistan, but heavily concentrated in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 11 million live in the nation and only represent 15% of the total population.⁴⁶ This disproportionate split of the Pashtun tribe, even though the border is extremely porous, is traced back to the British and Russian colonial agreement to enact the Durand Line in 1893. Historically, the Durand Line has done little to physically prevent the daily cross-border activities of the Pashtun people.

Throughout the centuries, the Pashtun people as an entire entity have not been subjugated by any centralized rule. Instead, centralized governments have had to build loose alliances with the Pashtun clans to keep them loyal to the ruling authority. This historical perspective directly influences today's current status of Pashtun and Pakistani governmental affairs.

Over the last century, the Pashtuns have desired their own country. Afghan Pashtuns believe they are the rightful ruler of Afghanistan, as they are the majority. While Pakistani Pashtuns, who are not the majority, question the legitimacy of the centralized Pakistani government as they were forcibly partitioned into the country in 1947.⁴⁷ Even though there appears on the surface to be two separate Pashtun populations, one Afghan and the other Pakistani separated by geographical boundaries, they generally have a sense of inter-tribal Pashtun nationalism that allows them to support one another during times of need.

⁴⁵ UNHCR Reference World, "World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Afghanistan : Pashtuns," <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,MRGI,,AFG,4562d8cf2,49749d6745,0.html> (accessed on October 7, 2010).

⁴⁶ Global Security, "Pashtun," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/pashtun.htm> (accessed October 5, 2010).

⁴⁷ Jon Lunn and Ben Smith, "The 'AfPak Policy' and the Pashtuns," *British House of Commons Library Research Paper* 10/45 (June 22, 2010) 7-9.

From 1947 up until December of 2002, there appeared to be an informal agreement or understanding between the Pakistani government and the Pashtun tribes in the NWFP and the FATA.⁴⁸ The arrangement had been for Pashtun allegiance to a centralized state, the Pakistani government and army would exercise little influence over these frontier areas, almost making them semi-autonomous sub-states within greater Pakistan. In late 2002, NATO combat operations in Afghanistan resulted in increased American pressure for the Pakistani government to address the militant threats posed by the insurgent forces operating in these Pashtun tribal belts. With the start of Pakistani military operations in these regions, that broke their informal agreement, increased tensions emerged between the Pashtun and Pakistani government. These tensions would later evolve to spawn a Pakistani Taliban movement.

The Taliban

According to a June 2010, British House of Commons' Research Paper, "the greatest international priority [...] is the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. These border areas are predominately inhabited by ethnic Pashtuns, from whom are drawn most of the membership of the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban, the two groups believed to be providing shelter and assistance to al-Qaeda."⁴⁹ The Taliban movement has had internal security implications that neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan could have predicted and requires a further investigation to comprehend the dynamics that affect these two countries' complex relationship.

To temporally understand the rise of the Taliban movement, the historical events surrounding their creation must be reviewed. Once the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan, many religious Pashtuns observed that unemployed mujahedin fighters were becoming increasingly corrupt and attempting to seize power to govern Afghanistan for their benefit at the expense of the common people. This evolved to create a Taliban movement that generally emerged from the disenfranchised Afghan Pashtun refugees in Pakistan, and specifically from the religious classrooms of the madrassas (religious schools) where

⁴⁸ Ibid, 7-9.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 1.

orphaned and disillusioned young males proved ripe for recruiting into this formidable religious-military-political movement. As Ahmed Rashid states in his book *Taliban*, “They saw themselves as the cleansers and purifiers of a guerrilla war gone astray, a social system gone wrong in an Islamic way of life that had been compromised by corruption and excess.”⁵⁰ Their leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, declared the goals of the Taliban to be the following: “restore peace, disarm the population, for sharia law, and to defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan.”⁵¹

What is critical to comprehend about the Taliban is the fact the organization's roots originate from within the Pashtun tribe. This movement is tribally based and not affiliated with any specific country, making it a complex organization to contain. Specifically complicating this dynamic was the reality that the Pashtun tribal boundaries extended within both Pakistan and Afghanistan, making this movement difficult to control from either country's perspective. Additionally, the Taliban's tribal roots within the Deobandi traditions of Islam, which is very similar to the Wahabbi religious sect on the Saudi peninsula, and the Pashtunwali⁵² tribal code reinforce the Pashtun desire to live within an imposed strict Islamic sharia type society. Their ideological foundation for this radical movement was to preserve Pashtun cultural, Islamic values, and totalitarian thinking.⁵³

In the mid-1990s, the Pakistani government supported the Taliban movement in an effort to achieve their strategic objective of disposing the Tajik-dominated government in Kabul, and of installing a pro-Pakistan government within its western neighbor. A Taliban-led Afghanistan would provide a sense of geographical strategic depth in the likelihood of a war with India and facilitate the Pakistanis ability to reach Central Asian markets through Afghanistan. Pakistani leaders believed that a Taliban-led

⁵⁰ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 23.

⁵¹ Ibid, 22.

⁵² Ibid, 4 and 112. Pashtunwali is a ancient Pashtun tribal code that dictates the expected behavior based on culture and religious. This code includes (this list is not totally inclusive all rules within the code): hospitality to visitors, asylum to persons requesting refuge, justice or revenge to violators, bravery to defend property and honor.

⁵³ South AsiaTerrorism Portal, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/usa/Taliban.htm#> (accessed on October 5, 2010).

Afghanistan would bring many rewards, but they did not foresee the negative repercussions of such a radical movement emanating from their western neighbor and operating within their nation. The Pakistani government assumed that once the Taliban secured Afghanistan, this Pashtun religious-military force would permanently depart Pakistan and take with it their approximate three million Afghan refugees. They also speculated it would provide an outlet or home, via a devout Islamic Afghanistan Republic, for Pakistani-based Islamic militants to migrate to with their extremist views.⁵⁴ The Afghan Taliban would never fully govern the entire nation prior to the NATO invasion in 2001, but at its high water mark in July of 1998, they controlled over 90% of the country.⁵⁵ Ultimately, the Pakistani leadership failed to foresee that the opposite intended effect would occur by supporting a radically expanding Taliban movement. The Taliban's influence further radicalized an already destabilized Pakistan in what has been perceived as "the Talibanization" of their western frontier Pakistan.⁵⁶

Pakistani Taliban = *Tehrik-e-Taliban* (TTP)

The Afghan and Pakistan Taliban cannot simply be viewed as two sides of the same coin.
-Jon Lunn and Ben Smith, *The 'AfPak Policy' and the Pashtuns*

Until 2002, there was only an Afghani Taliban movement. However, this same year a Pakistani Taliban or Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP or Movement of Students) slowly emerged in the NWFP and FATA, in response to aggressive Pakistani military operations and perceived governmental neglect by Islamabad.⁵⁷ Pakistan launched military operations under increasing U.S. pressure to crack down on the Afghan Taliban in the tribal belts that were affecting NATO combat operations along the Afghan side of the border. However, these operations backfired as Pakistani tribal leaders vehemently protested the

⁵⁴ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, 187.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 5.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 191.

⁵⁷ Jayshee Bajoria, "Pakistan's New Generation of Terrorists," *Council on Foreign Relations*, http://www.cfr.org/publication/15422/pakistans_new_generation_of_terrorists.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F13611%2Fjayshee_bajoria%3Fgroupby%3D1%26hide%3D1%26id%3D13611%26filter%3D456 (accessed March 30, 2009).

destructive Pakistani military tactics and did not want any further influence from what they perceived as a corrupt and disinterested central government in Islamabad.

For five years, this homegrown insurgency continued to expand. In December 2007, the Pakistani security forces' heavy-handed tactics in the deadly seizure of the Lal Masjid Mosque (commonly called the "Red Mosque") in Islamabad,⁵⁸ rallied the TTP movement into an officially formed federation under the influential leadership of Baitullah Meshud.⁵⁹ Up until this point, the TTP's strategic goal was to achieve an autonomous self-rule in the NWFP and FATA. The TTP would continue their armed opposition and execute domestic terrorist acts in a campaign to achieve their objectives against the central government's authorities and institutions. This led to an official government labeling of the approximate 30,000-man TTP movement as a terrorist organization in August 2008.⁶⁰ It is critical to recognize that the TTP was an independent movement from the Afghan Taliban, as their goals were separate and distinct. However, in early 2009, Mullah Omar extended a hand of friendship to TTP to create an official complimentary partnership between the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans. Mullah Omar wanted the organizations to "put aside their differences and support the Afghan Taliban in combating the American presence in Afghanistan."⁶¹ This led to a shura (tribal leader meeting) that officially merged the Afghan Taliban and TTP under the "Council of United Mujahedin"⁶² and the TTP redefining their strategic goals to "establish an Islamic state in Pakistan based on sharia law, to resist the Pakistani Army attempts to counter those and to support efforts to expel coalition forces from Afghanistan."⁶³ This

⁵⁸ Lunn and Smith, 42.

⁵⁹ Hassan Abbas, "A Profile of Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan," *CTC Sentinel*, Combating Terrorism Center) http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/17868/profile_of_tehrikitaliban_pakistan.html. (accessed November 8, 2008), 1-4.

⁶⁰ Jayshee Bajoria, "Pakistan's New Generation of Terrorists."

⁶¹ Carlotta Gall, Ismail Khan, Pir Zubair Shah, and Taimoor Shah, "Pakistani and Afghan Taliban Unify in Face of U.S. Influx," *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/world/asia/27taliban.html> (accessed March 27, 2009).

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Lunn and Smith, 43.

merger led to the TTP exponentially increasing their cross-border and domestic terrorist attacks to support their Afghani brothers' efforts. Two noteworthy TTP attacks highlighting the magnitude of their offensive operations were the December 2009 suicide attack on the U.S. Forward Operating Base (FOB) Chapman in Afghanistan that killed seven CIA operatives, to avenge the death of their former leader Baitullah Mehsud,⁶⁴ and the Lahore bombings that killed 86 Ahmadis Pakistanis.⁶⁵

Currently, the three strategies the Pakistani government is attempting to use to contain the TTP are to "divide and rule, peace deals, and the use of force."⁶⁶ The environmental dynamics that led to the creation of the TTP will continue to remain a major strategic challenge for the Pakistani government until a whole of government strategy is instituted by Islamabad to reconcile and reintegrate this domestic militant organization back into Pakistani mainstream society. The Pakistani government's failure to effectively influence the Taliban within their country is negatively affecting their diplomatic relationships with both Afghanistan and the U.S.

In 2010, the Pakistani military continued their unsuccessful attempt to contain the TTP in order to reduce their domestic terror activities and prevent the spread of their militant influence in the country. Until a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy is adopted by the central government, the TTP will continue destabilize Pakistan's internal security throughout the country in the execution of their domestic terrorist attacks on civilian officials, security forces, and government institutions.

Al Qaeda

Due to NATO's overwhelming military power when they invaded Afghanistan, they inadvertently pushed AQ out of Afghanistan and as General David Petraeus recently stated, "Pakistan is the headquarters of the Al Qaeda senior leadership."⁶⁷ Top AQ leaders and their operatives fled into

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Omar Waraich, "Religious Minorities Suffering Worst in Pakistan Floods," *Time Magazine*, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2015849,00.html>, (accessed November 14, 2010).

⁶⁶ Lunn and Smith, 44.

⁶⁷ Dreazen, "Al Qaeda's Global Base Is Pakistan, Says Petraeus."

Pakistan's western tribal belts to set up bases of operation, where they could continue to wage their global jihad. The Pakistani government and military's failure to strictly govern and secure the NWFP and FATA has given AQ a sanctuary to operate from with impunity.

Since the 1990s, AQ has networked itself extensively within the tribal belts of Pakistan and cemented itself within the tribes through intermarriages and religious Deobandi and Wahabi links. The lack of government control in these mountain havens allows AQ and other militants to operate outside the central Pakistani governmental control. This has generally made Pakistan into AQ's global headquarters for its internationally networked terrorist campaign. Even though the figures of the number AQ fighters are unknown, it is speculated that there are upwards to 300 hardcore operatives in Pakistan.⁶⁸ A number of these AQ operatives are foreign fighters coming from throughout the world to Pakistan's tribal areas to receive training to pursue jihad. Al Qaeda's residency in Pakistan's tribal areas is further providing another destabilizing force in the country and on its relationship with their western neighbor. Additionally, some British analysts state that AQ is being a mediator between militant groups to facilitate the formation of alliances to operationally cooperate in the name of the jihad.⁶⁹

Since the beginning of the Coalition war in Afghanistan, it has been universally understood that AQ leaders and their operatives have been operating out of Pakistan's NWFP and the FATA. It is widely rumored that some of AQ's senior leaders are operating in and around the provincial capital of Quetta.⁷⁰ The fact that AQ has a perceived unchallenged safe haven in Pakistan is a source of friction in diplomatic relations between the U.S., Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Pakistan vehemently denies claims that key AQ leaders, such as Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, are in Pakistan.

⁶⁸ Ian S. Livingston and Michael O'Hanlon, "Pakistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security," *Brooking Institute* (October 26, 2010): 5.

⁶⁹ Lunn and Smith, 46.

⁷⁰ Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Cooperation Against Al Qaeda," *Congressional Research Service* (October 19, 2010): 22-23.

There is significant international resentment leveraged on Islamabad for a perception of AQ, either purposefully or inadvertently, receiving sanctuary in Pakistan's frontier tribal regions. Al Qaeda operating out of Pakistan and attacking both into Afghanistan and globally provides much diplomatic tension between the Islamabad and Kabul's governments. This drastically affects their ability to constructively interact in a cooperative political manner to cultivate their collective interests.

One of the major reasons AQ is seeking refuge in Pakistan is to facilitate their training of terrorist operatives. Taking advantage of the Pakistani government's weak attempt to eradicate them from their safe havens, they have sponsored domestic terrorist acts against the Pakistani government and military organizations to further destabilize Pakistan's U.S.-backed government. By attacking the Islamabad government and its associated institutions, AQ hopes to achieve the operational space they need to influence the Pakistani population to support them rather than the Islamabad government. By using Islam as a rallying cry to unite the people, their ultimate aim is to gain the support of the greater Pakistani population against the central government. Since 2002, when Pakistani military operations commenced in the frontier tribal belts, Pakistani military operations have led to what is perceived as a tremendous amount of inexcusable collateral damage, resulting in thousands of innocent Pakistani civilians being killed or displaced. This collateral damage has increased AQ, the TTP, and other militant organization's popular support at the detriment of the central government. The Pakistani security forces' immature counterinsurgency strategy has perpetuated many negative affects to public support of the government.

There are strong indicators that AQ operatives are training the TTP and other prominent Pakistani militant groups. These AQ homegrown Pakistani terrorist organizations are attacking government, military, and a number of minority religious sects within the country. Key indicators of such AQ signature tactics are the ever-increasing number of complex suicide bombings and IED attacks. Until 2003, there had never been a recorded suicide attack in Pakistan's history.⁷¹ Al Qaeda's influence on

⁷¹ South AsiaTerrorism Portal, "Taliban," <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/usa/Taliban.htm#> (accessed October 5, 2010).

domestic militant organizations has resulted in this relatively new terror tactics in the country, which led to 80 recorded suicide attacks in 2009.⁷²

According to various Pakistani media outlets, Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership and their operatives have been moving out of the frontier tribal areas due to American unmanned aerial missile strikes. A report in the Pakistani *Daily Times* recently stated that a Pakistani intelligence officer reported that, “60 to 70% of high-ranking Al Qaeda officials are on the run and they plan to devise a major attack on the West[...]insurgent leaders are on the move towards Karachi and work to protect themselves from the increased drone attacks. It is common knowledge that the Quetta Shura is actually the Karachi Shura, and that Pakistan has given the Taliban and Al Qaeda refuge within the country.”⁷³ There are rumors that Mullah Omar has attempted to escape the frontier areas to the urban area in Karachi or another part of Baluchistan to avoid such U.S. drone strikes. The U.S. drone attacks have met some success in killing a portion of the AQ leaders, but it is currently unknown if the effects are enduring in dismantling AQ’s terror network and if AQ leaders are dispersing from tribal areas into urban centers to control their jihad.

The research further determined that AQ’s conduct of their jihad from within Pakistan is destabilizing to the detriment of their internal security. Until Pakistan takes offensive measures to eradicate AQ from within their borders, they will continue to negatively influence not only Pakistan, but also Afghanistan.

Impact of Refugees

In the last two decades, Afghan refugee camps and villages in Pakistan have been a breeding ground for disenfranchised military age males that are plagued by high unemployment, poverty, and increased suffering. Inspired by religious and militant leaders, they see joining a militant group as an honorable opportunity to wage jihad and a means to gain monetary compensation. In a recent study published by Scribd titled *Insurgency & Terrorism in Afghanistan: Who is Fighting and Why?*, the author

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ South AsiaTerrorism Portal, “Pakistan: Footprints of Terror,” <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/kpsgill/2003/chapter2.htm> (accessed November 7, 2010).

states that the militant “fighters are predominantly Afghan refugee, made up of idealists trained and recruited in Pakistan, young recruits with no viable economic alternatives both from Pakistan and Afghanistan, and opportunists primarily motivated by monetary gain.”⁷⁴ Additionally, David Byman reinforces this point that Afghan refugees are not being recruited by militant groups because of the extremist religious motivations, but primarily because of the conditions they live in and the hope for a better existence.⁷⁵ The refugee crisis in Pakistan is causing an increase in unemployment, an economic drain on Pakistan’s resources, and worst of all, filling the ranks of the militant groups that are attacking the governmental and security force institutions in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The first significant Afghan refugee movement into Pakistan occurred when the communists seized power in Kabul in 1978. With the Soviet occupation, it is estimated that by the late 1980s, that upwards to 4 million Afghans fled to the east.⁷⁶ These refugee camps served as the epicenter for Afghan guerrilla recruiting and training. This legacy practice continues today as militant organizations draw new recruits from these camps to fill their ranks.

The second mass exodus of refugees occurred when NATO forces invaded Afghanistan, the majority of displaced persons moved into the FATA, NWFP and Balochistan Provinces, greatly straining Pakistan’s governmental capacity and economy. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) 2009 Report stated that there were still approximately 1.9 million displaced Afghans still in Pakistan.⁷⁷ Additionally, the UNHCR reported that there were more than 80 known reported Afghan camps in Pakistan, with 71 in NWFP, 12 in Balochistan and one in Punjab. The Taliban have enjoyed the

⁷⁴ Robert Senste, “Insurgency and Terrorism in Afghanistan,” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/13075023/Insurgency-and-Terrorism-in-Afghanistan> (accessed OCT 8, 2010), 19.

⁷⁵ David Byman, *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Santa Monica: RAND Publishing, 2001), 61-67.

⁷⁶ U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, “U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 2002 – Pakistan,” <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=search&docid=3d04c152c&skip=0&q=refugees> (accessed October 8, 2010).

⁷⁷ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Global Report 2009, Pakistan,” <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c57cc6a0.html> (accessed 8 October 2010).

number of displaced Pashtun volunteers that see the Taliban fight in Afghanistan as an honorable reason to join their ranks to support regaining their country back from its U.S. supported, Tajik-dominated Kabul government. Additionally, AQ has recruited a number of volunteers to serve as operatives to attack targets in the region and globally.

The madrassas (Islamic religious schools) in and around the refugee camps serve as recruitment centers for the terrorist organizations. Particularly in the NWFP and Baluchistan, the camp madrassas' mullahs (religious leaders) conspire with the militant leaders to have these young men join their cause.⁷⁸ So effective at recruiting refugees in these camps to execute their terrorist missions, NWFP Senior Minister Ahmed Bilour stated in 2009 that, "200 children between the ages 6 to 13 years had been recovered from Malakand in the NWFP. The children had been completely brainwashed to conduct suicide attacks."⁷⁹

Three recent natural disasters in Pakistan, the 2005 Earthquake, and the 2007 and 2010 summer monsoon floods have played into the militant hands to get more recruits. In the recent summer monsoon flood, which affected a fifth of the country, the Pakistani government had a very difficult time providing aid (food, shelter, and materials) and evacuation support to the affected civilian population. To exploit this devastating event, the TTP, AQ, LeT and JD all reportedly distributed aid and set up medical stations to treat hundreds of the displaced people in the FATA and NWFP in an effort to gain increased popularity and potential recruits from those affected.⁸⁰ They quickly pointed out the Pakistani government's inability to care for them, further driving a wedge between the government and these already skeptical Pakistani citizens. The militant's use of these tragic natural disasters demonstrates their cunning ability to harness the synergy needed to gain popularity at the expense of a weak Pakistani government.

⁷⁸ Lunn and Smith, 14.

⁷⁹ South Asia Terrorism Portal, "Pakistan Assessment 2010," <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/index.htm> (accessed October 8, 2010).

⁸⁰ International Crisis Group, "Pakistan: The Worsening IDP Crisis," *International Crisis Group Paper* (September 16, 2010): 3-5.

The national government reaction over the last decade to these refugee camps has complicated an already complex issue by forcibly deporting or arresting Afghan refugees.⁸¹ The government policy of deliberate deportation has concentrated on pushing Afghan males out of Pakistan, as they will not forcibly deport women and children, often splitting families and causing further suffering that further motivates refugees to join militant groups. A UNHCR spokesperson stated that this method of deportation is causing the refugees to “live in a state of fear.”⁸² However, the Pakistani government’s deportation of these Afghan refugees is due to their fear that additional Afghans will flee into Pakistan, further saddling their government with additional economic strains and security issues.⁸³

The last point of contention that drives the refugees into the formations of the militants is the heavy-handed tactics used by the Pakistani military in their offensive operations. In the most recent example in March 2010 in the Orakzai frontier area, the military’s indiscriminate use of heavy firepower displaced upwards of 328,000 people, with thousands of their relatives killed.⁸⁴ The militants used the military’s heavy-handed tactics against them to gain material and manpower support from the displaced people to wage increased retribution-type attacks against the security forces that set garrisons in these newly “cleared” locations.⁸⁵

The refugee crisis in Pakistan is a complex issue that continues to challenge the government’s ability to exercise control over its territorial domain in the western tribal regions. Pakistan’s internal security is adversely influenced by this social issue and will continue to be a major issue into the immediate future until a whole of government solution is devised in conjunction with the Afghan government to resolve this refugee crisis.

⁸¹ United Kingdom Border Agency, “Country of Origin Information Report - Pakistan,” *United Kingdom Border Agency Report*, January 18, 2010, p. 190.

⁸² U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, “U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 2002 – Pakistan.”

⁸³ United Kingdom Border Agency, “Country of Origin Information Report – Pakistan.”

⁸⁴ International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: The Worsening IDP Crisis.”

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

Domestic Terrorism

In March 2009, counterinsurgency expert and senior advisor to U.S. military leaders, David Kilcullen stated, “that Pakistan could collapse within six months if immediate steps are not taken to remedy the situation.”⁸⁶ The situation that Kilcullen was alluding to is the extensive rise in domestic terrorism in Pakistan that was rocking the country’s foundation. Recent attacks have also demonstrated that no portion of Pakistan is immune to terror attacks from homegrown militants. The Institute for Conflict Management recorded 2009 as one of the most violent years in Pakistan’s recent history.⁸⁷ There was a thousand percent spike in domestic terrorist attacks from 2003 to 2011, with over 11,585 Pakistani government and civilian fatalities.⁸⁸ This out-of-control violence is the product of a number of key volatile domestic issues, but specifically due to the central government’s failed leadership to execute a comprehensive domestic strategy that would curb the militancy and ethnic violence.

The research demonstrates that one of the major motivators for militant domestic terror attacks is retaliation against the Pakistani governmental institutions and security forces. The increased international and domestic pressure on the Pakistani government to eliminate terrorist organizations since 2002, has led to Pakistani security forces conducting increased military operations on militant strongholds in the NWFP and FATA. Lashing out, these terrorist organizations have purposefully attacked any type of governmental institution. For example, when the Pakistani Air Force conduct airstrikes against TTP elements in the Teerah Valley in Khyber, which resulted in 60-suspected militants and their families killed, in retaliation the TTP responded with a series of suicide attacks on Pakistani Army garrisons and police stations.⁸⁹ The Pakistani security forces’ weak counterinsurgency capability and non-existent comprehensive government strategy to defeat these cancerous militant organizations has allowed these

⁸⁶ South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Pakistan Assessment 2010.”

⁸⁷ Ibid. According to the portal, due to strict Pakistan control of the media, these total numbers could be higher.

⁸⁹ The Dawn Media Group, “Taliban Claim Responsibility for Lahore Attacks,” <http://news.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/03-taliban-claim-responsibility-for-lahore-attacks-ss-02> (accessed September 21, 2010).

terrorists to continuously operate within the country, and target the institutions that govern and protect the greater Pakistani population.

Another key motivation for the domestic terror attacks is the unpopular Pakistani governmental support of NATO operations in Afghanistan. Additionally, the public perception that U.S. intelligence operatives working within their country, coupled with the routine U.S. employment of unmanned aerial drone missile attacks, serve as an inspiration for militant attacks on governmental organizations. The unpopularity of the NATO operations in Afghanistan has provided an alliance building opportunity between many various Pakistani terrorist organizations, such as the TTP, Haqqani Network, LeT, and LeJ.⁹⁰ The September 7, 2010, TTP suicide attack on a police station in Maranshah, that killed 14 policemen and civilians, was launched after an earlier U.S. drone missile attack against TTP operatives in the area. Azam Tariq, spokesman for the TTP, told reporters by telephone that, “We are targeting Pakistani security forces because the government has allowed America to launch drone attacks on us.”⁹¹ The frequency of U.S. drone missile strikes and the rate of militant attacks in retaliation have continued to progressively increase in the last year.

Militants have used public discontent with the NATO war in their neighborhood, and its secondary effects on Pakistan, to exploit the opportunity to target minority ethnic and religious sects within Pakistan. Since the 1947 partition, Pakistan has experienced periodic outbreaks of inter-ethnic violence. Extremist organizations are instigating such violence to destabilize the internal security environment and to rile up public discontent towards the weak Islamabad government. During the summer of 2010, there was a substantial uptick in violence, where Sunni extremists took the opportunity to attack Shia and the minority Ahmadi communities. Qari Meshud, known as a prominent TTP “mentor of suicide bombers,” stated after the September 3, 2010 suicide attacks that killed 53 and wound 197

⁹⁰ K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments,” *Congressional Research Service* (June 1, 2010): 11-13.

⁹¹ Alex Rodriguez and Zulfikar Ali, “Suicide blast kills at least 14 as militants continue attacks in Pakistan,” *Los Angeles Times*, <http://www.canada.com/news/Taliban+says+will+continue+Pakistan+suicide+attacks/3489020/story.html> (accessed on October 8, 2010).

Shiites in Quetta at the end of Ramadan, “that although the TTP primarily attacks the U.S. and the Pakistani government, ‘Shias are also our target.’”⁹² Some of these attacks are not only intended to destroy the government’s credibility, but are also specifically perceived to be a strategic campaign waged by the TTP to gain increased control of territory in the Balochistan Province, where the TTP is rumored to be headquartered in the capitol of Quetta. There is also a perception that the TTP is attempting to promote a “Talibanization” of the frontier areas to gain permanent territorial control to support their strategic objectives within Pakistan.⁹³

As Pakistan continues to be pressed to take control of its territory, it is expected that domestic terror attacks will continue with a detrimental effect. This wrestling for control will have a deep destabilizing effect on Pakistan’s internal security and may inadvertently add stress on the current Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship.

External Security Complexities

It’s our history. A history of three wars with a larger neighbor. India is five times larger than we are. Their military strength is five times larger. In 1971, our country was disintegrated. So the security issue for Pakistan is an issue of survival.

-Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto

Since Pakistan’s creation, external security has been their number one strategic concern and continues today to plague the country. As Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto eloquently stated above, security is not about retaining a Pakistani way of life, but is truly a matter of their “survival” as a nation-state. The seriousness to which the Pakistanis approach external security directly influences how they diplomatically negotiate the waters of an intensely dynamic region. The haphazard division of Pakistan and Afghanistan has prevented these countries, composed of widely ethnically diverse populations, from uniting their people under one nation. To compensate for not having a real sense of total national unity among its incongruous population, their leaders have used the perception, and in some

⁹² Al Jeerza, “Deadly Bombing at Pakistan Rally,” <http://www.sott.net/articles/show/214682-Deadly-bombing-at-Pakistan-rally> (accessed October 8, 2010).

⁹³ Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, It’s Army, and the Wars Within* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 545.

cases reality, of external threats and Islam as a method to glue their society together through an unhealthy paranoia.⁹⁴ This focus on external security threats has managed to inadvertently complicate Pakistan's diplomatic relationships with its regional neighbors.

This section of the monograph will discuss the regional external security challenges associated with a western Afghanistan neighbor. There will be a focused narrative on the impact of NATO operations in Afghanistan that influence Pakistan's external security. Then the discussion will examine Pakistan's strategy to protect itself from India by constructing an Afghanistan-Pakistan alliance that produces a Pakistani strategic depth while preventing Indian influence within Afghanistan. This attempt to deny India access into Afghanistan will strategically prevent an Indian militarily oriented geographical encirclement of Pakistan and will stop an India economic exploration of Afghanistan. Afterwards, the discussion will conclude with the analysis of Chinese and Iranian influences in Afghanistan that impact Pakistan's external security.

Impact of NATO Operations in Afghanistan on Pakistan External Security

The extremists who have taken root in the border area of Pakistan and Afghanistan have attacked us before... they are now attempting to destabilize, if not overthrow the Pakistani Government and take back enough control, if not the entire country of Afghanistan.

-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, *House Armed Services Committee Remarks, December 2009*

Since the NATO invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, their operations have imposed a number of elaborate and substantial external security issues on Pakistan. The serious implications of NATO's predominant Western coalition and their prosecution of the war in Afghanistan add a further level of complexity to the regional dynamics. NATO operations are adversely affecting Pakistan's external security by perpetrating an unintended unifying effect among Islamic extremist, through both their unmanned aerial drone attacks on sovereign Pakistani territory and their ever-increasing political pressures on Pakistan, which in total substantially feeds their nation's instability.

⁹⁴ Melanie Hanif, "Indian Involvement in Afghanistan: Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block to Regional Hegemony," *German Institute of Global and Area Studies Research Programme: Institute of Asian Studies*, No 98, (April 2009): 20.

Due to a number unforeseen consequences emanating from NATO operations and U.S. policies in Afghanistan, there appears to be a steady climb in religious extremist organizations' strength as Muslim males enlist to fight the perceived Christian invaders in Afghanistan. The impression of a predominantly Western coalition fighting in a Muslim country has allowed extremist organizations in Pakistan to spread a worldwide call for jihadi volunteers to join the fight in Afghanistan. Additionally, the perception of the U.S. installation of a puppet Karzai government, with a large number of minority Tajik and Uzbek government officials and military officers that are historically pro-Indian and/ or pro-Iranian, further motivates their cause. In addition, India's political and economic interaction with the Afghan government and NATO partners are perceived by Pakistan as a Hindu-Western attempt to corrupt their Muslim neighbor. These factors bolster their jihadi call-to-arms in Afghanistan, directly having a strategic external and internal security impact on Pakistan. Extremist organizations, which are both transiting or basing their operations out of Pakistan, are escalating the international communities' diplomatic pressure on the Pakistani government. The majority of this stress stems from two significant sources. One is international pressure on Pakistan to stop the inflow of jihadists from Pakistan into Afghanistan and their elimination of safe havens in the FATA and NWFP. Second, and more importantly, the pressures from these security issues that arise from this complex environment challenge the Pakistani government's ability to rule the nation to the point of potentially spinning the nation towards a worst case failed state status. The government's inability to control the FATA and NWFP has a secondary effect on the remainder of the country, as the population loses faith in the ability of Islamabad to properly govern the nation.

Another point of contention that arises from NATO operations in Afghanistan, are the unrelenting U.S. unmanned aerial drone strikes in the NWFP and FATA. This tactic has many negative unintended consequences in Pakistan. Most important is the perception among Pakistani citizens that the U.S. is doing what it wants in their country with no international repercussions, which is unsettling to them. Even though these strikes kill a number of high-ranking terrorists, they also unfortunately kill and maim a significant number of innocent civilians, which enrages the average Pakistani to protest such strikes.

Furthermore, their government's inability to influence the prevention of these strikes feeds the belief that the current Pakistani government is a puppet of the U.S. The reality is that regardless of the success of these attacks in killing militant leaders, they adversely influence the external and internal security environment in Pakistan. Lastly, NATO operations in Afghanistan continue to add increased complexity to the Pakistani external security situation and cause a difficult foreign relationship between D.C. and Islamabad.

Impact of Indian Operations in Afghanistan on Pakistan External Security

India and Pakistan continue their dangerous cat and mouse game that has existed since their partition in 1947. Over the last 60 years, both nuclear nations have had uneasy foreign relations stemming from land disputes when they were separated. This has led to three major wars and continuous strained relations evolving over the Kashmir disputed territory. There are many indications that both countries are executing a proxy war in Afghanistan to gain strategic advantage over the other in their ongoing adversarial relationship.⁹⁵ As regional expert Ahmed Rashid points out, "Kabul had suddenly become the new Kashmir – the new battleground for the India-Pakistan rivalry."⁹⁶ This proxy war in Afghanistan is producing a most concerning external security threat to Pakistan and has the propensity to lead to greater regional destabilization or worst case, all out war.

To appreciate this regional complexity, there must be an understanding of both nations' viewpoints on the importance of a strategic alliance with Afghanistan and the denial of each country's access to this geographically important nation. India historically, except during the Taliban's reign, has supported all Afghani governments. The friendly Indian-Afghani alliance served to strengthen an unhealthy Pakistani paranoia that India is attempting to influence an implosion of Pakistan that would enable India to reacquire this sub-continent land mass that was formerly part of its nation. Through its friendly foreign relations with the Karzai government, Pakistan accuses India of attempting to gain a

⁹⁵ Alex Newman, "India-Pakistan 'Proxy War' Complicates Afghanistan," *The New American*, <http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/world-mainmenu-26/asia-mainmenu-33/3094-india-pakistan-proxy-war-complicates-afghanistan>, (accessed July 13, 2010).

⁹⁶ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent in Chaos* (New York: Penguin Group, 2008), 110.

strategically encirclement of their nation.⁹⁷ The idea of strategic encirclement is not new, as the famous ancient Indian military philosopher Kautilya outlined in his Mandala theory of foreign policy, “immediate neighbors are considered as enemies, but any state on the other side of a neighboring state is regarded as an ally or the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”⁹⁸ In keeping with Kautilya’s theory, India would deny Pakistan a positive relationship with Afghanistan and ultimately allow India to both militarily and economically contain Pakistan from two fronts, facilitating a greater geographical Indian control over Pakistan.

Further adding to the friction between Pakistan and India, there have been a number of terrorist attacks against Indian aide workers in Afghanistan, linked to Pakistani sponsored militant groups and ISI operatives within Afghanistan.⁹⁹ According to Ambassador Parthasarathy, former Indian envoy to Pakistan, “There has been a consistent policy of targeting Indians and Indian projects in Afghanistan. It’s no doubt a decision taken by the Taliban. Pakistan is directly or indirectly complicit in the attack.”¹⁰⁰ As questions of future NATO withdrawals or reductions of forces in Afghanistan are raised, India fears that this may set the conditions for a reconciliation agreement between the Karzai government and the Taliban that would directly impact their current relationship. Additionally, their gravest concern is that it could facilitate a Taliban-Pashtun political motion to evict India from Afghanistan or, worst case, set the conditions for a Pashtun violent or non-violent takeover of the Afghan government, which would definitely make Afghanistan anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmad Rashid, “From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 87, Issue 6, (November/December, 2008): 30-44.

⁹⁸ Roger Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India,” *Journal of Military History*, Volume 67, Number 1 (January 2003): 19. Kautilya is generally considered the Sun Tzu of ancient Indian military theory.

⁹⁹ Sreeram Chaulia, “What India should do in Afghanistan,” *The Financial Express*, <http://www.financialexpress.com/news/what-india-should-do-in-afghanistan/585837/>, (accessed October 4, 2010).

¹⁰⁰ Rupee News, “Proxy War in Afghanistan: Strategic Depth vs Strategic Clout,” <http://rupeenews.com/2008/07/07/proxy-war-in-afghanistan-strategic-depth-vs-strategic-clout/> (accessed September 22, 2010).

¹⁰¹ Immanuel Wallerstein, “Afghanistan: Does Anyone Want the Burden?” <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=41961> (accessed October 16, 2010).

General McChrystal stated in his 2009 *Commander's Initial Assessment*, “the current Afghanistan government is perceived by Islamabad as pro-Indian. While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tension and Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India.”¹⁰² Since the country’s partition, Pakistan has had a rocky relationship with Afghanistan and this is why it backed the Taliban in order to achieve their strategic goal of a pro-Pakistani government in Kabul. The root of this regional objective is to essentially provide Pakistan the “strategic depth” that would allow Pakistan, in the case of a major conflict with India, an increased geographical area to maneuver and strategically delay an Indian invasion until an international intervention could occur to preclude an Indian annexation of their nation.¹⁰³ As regional expert, J. Alexander Thier commented about the regional dynamics, “Pakistan has existential concerns about Indian involvement in Afghanistan, as they see it as a form of encirclement aimed at the weakening or dismemberment of Pakistan. Pakistan relies on Afghanistan for ‘strategic depth’ — it would support Pakistan in the event of another war with India, including providing a retreat area for overwhelmed conventional forces.”¹⁰⁴ To Pakistan, India’s intervention in Afghani affairs poses a real and catastrophically dangerous threat to its very existence.

Analyzing the situation further from the Pakistani viewpoint, Pakistan believes that India is employing a tactic of “soft power”¹⁰⁵ in Afghanistan, to preclude a pro-Pakistani Afghan government and policy. In the eyes of Pakistanis, they see this pursuit by India as a means to gain a strategic encirclement

¹⁰² Commander International Security Forces Afghanistan, “Initial Assessment Report,” (August 30, 2009), 2-11.

¹⁰³ Pakistan Defence, “Defining Strategic Depth,” <http://www.defence.pk/forums/strategic-geopolitical-issues/44672-defining-strategic-depth-2.html> (accessed November 10, 2010). Strategic depth is a concept that facilitates the insulation of a military’s core capacity through a concept of a defense in depth. The intent is to militarily use the geography to the defenders advantage to maximize the utilization combat power to attrite or destroy the opposing military.

¹⁰⁴ The Dawn Media Group, “India, Pakistan’s ‘proxy war’ in Afghanistan,” <http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/04-india-pak-proxy-afg-qs-02> (accessed September 22, 2010).

¹⁰⁵ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power* (New York: Perseus Book Group, 2004), 5-7. “Soft power” is defined as the ability to influence others to obtain what others and one wants through attraction and co-option.

of their nation, to provide strategic advantage in a potential future conflict. This would facilitate the conditions India would need to secure a victory in case of war. Pakistan points to the facts that since the beginning of NATO operations in Afghanistan, India has opened six consulates throughout the country and an embassy in Kabul. Also, India is currently the fifth largest international donor in Afghanistan. As of the spring 2010, India donated upwards of USD 1.2 billion.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, India's employment of over 4,000 Indian citizens in Afghanistan to work on development and reconstruction projects continues to perpetuate Pakistan suspicions of India's intent. They assume that these projects serve India's strategic goals in Afghanistan to developing a pro-Indian Kabul. These large soft power projects include such initiatives as the construction of a major highway that runs from the Iranian seaport in Chabahar into Afghanistan and the joint electrical and oil pipeline projects that provide resources into Afghanistan, with the hope of continuing overland links that will eventually bring these resources directly into India.¹⁰⁷ The Chabahar seaport will provide India and other nations the capability to deliver goods in Afghanistan without having to go overland through Pakistan, further economically depriving Pakistani goods access in Afghanistan markets. Additional charges by Pakistan against India are their funneling of resource support to militants associated with the Baluchistan insurgency from Afghanistan into Pakistan, to support their armed struggle against the central government. Pakistan also states that India's Research and Analysis Wing (Raw)¹⁰⁸ has intelligence operatives in Afghanistan, supported from their consulates, to prevent Pakistani influence in their western neighbor and conduct intelligence collection against Pakistan across the AF-PAK border.¹⁰⁹ Additionally, Pakistan accuses the RAW of training Balochistan militant organizations in Afghanistan.¹¹⁰ Other accusations of Indian strategic encirclement includes rumors of

¹⁰⁶ Saifullah Ahmadzai, "India and Pakistan: Proxy War in Afghanistan," *Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies* (April 15, 2010): 3.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) is the Indian official national intelligence organization, generally serves the same functions as the United States' Central Intelligence Agency.

¹⁰⁹ Ishtiaq Ahmed, "India-Pakistan Relations Post-Mumbai Terrorist Attacks," *Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies*, No. 89 (January 7, 2010): 2.

counterfeiting Pakistani rubles and injecting them into Pakistan to devalue their currency¹¹¹ and the fact that India channeled support for the Northern Alliance through the Indian airbase at Farkhor, Tajikistan.¹¹² All of these actions by India within and around Afghanistan provide Pakistan the evidence to support its suspicion that India is attempting to strategically encircle their country.

To further reinforce the Pakistani nation's core belief that they deserve the right to be partners with their western Muslim Afghani brother, and not a Hindu India, the popular Pakistani military President, General Zia, stated in 1988, "We have earned the right to have [in Kabul] a power, which is very friendly to us. We have taken risks as a frontline state, and we will not permit a return to the prewar situation, marked by large Indian and Soviet influence in Afghan claims on our own territory."¹¹³ India's current initiatives in Afghanistan are posing a significant external threat on Pakistan that could lead to a volatile situation that sparks a catastrophic regional conflict.

Impact of China in Afghanistan on Pakistan External Security

China's strategic interest in Afghanistan stems from three general foreign policy objectives.¹¹⁴ First, China has economic interests in Afghanistan, which will be discussed in greater detail in a later portion of this monograph. Second, China wants to prevent the exportation of militant Islamic ideology into their country. This stems from China sharing a porous 76-kilometer border with Afghanistan through the Wakhjar Pass into their Xinjiang Province. The Chinese historical concern is over the Uighur Muslims', in Xinjiang, struggle for independence over their Beijing rulers.¹¹⁵ Therefore, China has

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ahmadzai, 4.

¹¹² Raghav Sharma, *India in Central Asia*. New Delhi, India: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Special Report, No. 63, January 2009, 2.

¹¹³ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 175.

¹¹⁴ Zahid N. Mann, *The Nature of Insurgency in Afghanistan and the Regional Power Politics* (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2010), 95-96.

¹¹⁵ Ziad Haider, "Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xingjian's Uighurs," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XLV, No 4, (July/August 2005): 523.

diplomatically engaged both Afghanistan and Pakistan to establish pro-Sino relations between the collective countries to preclude a militant Islamic spillover across their border.

Third, the Chinese foreign policy in Afghanistan is interlinked with its policy with Pakistan, which is to ensure economic access across the region, and to counter both U.S. and Indian influence in the region that would negatively affect a growing China. Currently, the assessment of Chinese relations with Afghanistan concludes that China's interaction with Pakistan's western neighbor is not causing a negative external security impact on Pakistan. The fact that the three nations' collective foreign relations are friendly is positive from their point of view, only the U.S. and India are concerned about such a Chinese intrusion as they do not know the long term implications on them from this tri-nation interaction.

Impact of Iran in Afghanistan on Pakistan External Security

The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan historically changed the tempered friendly relationship between Islamabad and Tehran. The repercussions of the U.S.-Iranian hostage crisis made the predominant Shiite Iran an international outsider. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Iran pursued a neutral stance in the war to facilitate a civil relationship with communist Moscow. The Khomeini government continued indirect support for the minority Shia population in Afghanistan, a minority that did not pose a military threat against the Soviet backed Afghan government. However, the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Tehran provided political and military support to the Northern Alliance in an effort to stop what they perceive as a Sunni Pashtun spread of Deobandi extremism. Iran's support of anti-Taliban forces was directly at odds with Pakistan, but the friction never boiled to the point of overt hostilities between the countries.

Currently, relations between Iran and Pakistan remain civil. However, there is some political and economic tension, stemming from Iran allowing India to construct from the Iranian port in Chabahar a highway into Afghanistan.¹¹⁶ This highway will allow India to transport its exportable goods into Afghanistan via the Iranian port, totally negating the requirement for a current trade agreement with

¹¹⁶ Mohsin M Milani, "Iran's Policy Towards Afghanistan," *The Middle East Journal*; Vol 60, No 2, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=28343&cfc=1> (accessed October 15, 2010).

Pakistan to allow its commerce to move through Pakistan into Afghanistan. This rerouting of Indian trade through Iran would ultimately reduce Pakistan's current ability to economically influence India's interaction with its western neighbor. The perception of an India-Iran economic alliance feeds a Pakistani suspicion that the two countries may be militarily aligning themselves and further using Afghanistan to gain a strategic military advantage over Pakistan.

One area that shows Iranian and Pakistan cooperation, given an Afghanistan neighbor, is the increasing collaborative manner in which the two countries are working to reduce the Balochistan insurgency, which affects both countries. A demonstration of this cooperation is the 2008, Pakistani arrest and deportation of Balochistan insurgency leader Abdolhamid Rigi to Iran.¹¹⁷ The current analysis determines that Iran is not intentionally leveraging Afghanistan to provide them a regional advantage over Pakistan and that their political interaction will keep the relationship between the two neighbors civil.¹¹⁸

Dynamics of Pakistan-Afghan Relations on Internal Politics

This section of the monograph will explore the dynamics of internal Pakistani politics and how they are consequentially influencing the Pakistani government's relationship with Afghanistan. Then the research will uncover the complexities of the government's inadvertent power sharing with the military, provincial governments, powerful elites and ethnic majorities. Lastly, the section will conclude with the political repercussions associated Afghan perceptions that the Pakistan government is sponsoring elements that adversely affect their nation.

Afghan-Pakistan Political Environment = Commonalities and Disjointedness

Based on the events that formed these two nations, the Afghan-Pakistan political relationship has historically been tense. Additionally, the arbitrary nature of the Pakistani partition from India set the conditions for the current problematic internal political framework that led to four military coups where no elected civilian government has ever reached its term limit. Pakistan's attempt to formally ground

¹¹⁷B. Raman, "Situation in Iranian Balochistan: An Update," <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3936.html> (accessed October 15, 2010).

¹¹⁸ Milani, "Iran's Policy Towards Afghanistan."

itself in democracy has not reached fruition. Internal political upheaval throughout the last six decades and most importantly, the lasting impression of General Zia's presidential exploitation of Islam to serve as a medium to unite the country, has ultimately left Pakistan's democratic foundation shaky.

The historical autocratic rule associated with Afghanistan and three decades of war have bred a political cynicism between the two nations. Even though both nations share many commonalities through shared religion, culture, and ethnicity, they have had a disjointed political relationship. This underlying distrust between the nations has interfered with them achieving a fully cooperative political alliance.

In their most recent history, from Pakistani sponsorship of the Taliban to the perceived NATO installation of the current Karzai government, both nations have had a difficult time reconciling their pasts in order to build a more positive future through a complementary partnership. From the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan to the installation of a perceived Northern Alliance dominated Kabul government, Pakistanis find it difficult to achieve their goal of a pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan. To most government officials and military leaders in Pakistan, the perception that a corrupt Pashtun president surrounded by former Tajik and Uzbek warlords and elites who lead the current Afghan government is hard to accept. The Pakistanis' historical and current perception of an informal alliance with the Pashtun population profoundly influences their relationship with Kabul. Pakistanis speculate that the current Karzai government will further politically alienate the Pashtun majority in Afghanistan, which will inversely affect Pakistan's governmental capacity to control the Pashtun population in its nation.

Complexities of the Government and Power Sharing

Fundamentally, the Pakistani governmental system failed to fully achieve its original separatist goal of democracy. Mohammed Jinnah's vision of a democratic Islamic and homogenous society within Pakistan was never truly reached, primarily because of its ethno-demographic disparities and secular views of non-Islamism.¹¹⁹ These social fissures over the last six decades have resulted in the failure "to

¹¹⁹ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 54.

establish enduring and credible political institutes” that has aroused instability in Pakistan.¹²⁰ The impacts of this instability are felt beyond the borders of Pakistan and influence its relationship with Afghanistan.

The constant internal political interplay between the civilian politicians, senior military generals, urban elites, ethnic tribal and Islamic leaders – who all influence the volatility of the central government’s power and influence - within the country makes governing Pakistan extremely difficult. As regional expert Sumantra Bose points out, Pakistan was generally separated upon conception and still remains, split into either a socially elite population (composed of the educated, military, and Westernized moderate urbanites) that wishes for a more democratic form of government against a more traditionally Muslim population (Islamist, poor and rural populations) that wants a theocratic central government.¹²¹

Pakistan’s political framework remains a major obstacle that plagues the government in gaining political stability. Further complicating the framework is that there are upwards of 46 political parties in this semi-democratic nation that have contributed to undermining the political system through power grabbing and corruption. Additionally, the sheer magnitude of having this many political parties, with their own competing agendas and visions, cripples the democratic process from taking hold.

The Pakistani military is regarded as the only truly stable government institution, hence the four successful military coups in its history. Current military-political relations are starting to buckle under internal political pressures that may break the government and lead to another military takeover of the government.¹²² In September 2010, Pakistani Army Chief General Kayani called a meeting with President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani, telling them that civilian leadership needs to “put its house in order” by taking measures to improve Pakistan’s weak economy, reducing political corruption, and

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Sumuntra Bose, “Decolonization and State Building in South Asia,” *Journal of International Affairs*, <http://www.allbusiness.com/government/3493363-1.html> (accessed October 21, 2010).

¹²² The Statesman, “Pak Army Chief tells Zardari, Gilani to put their House in Order,” http://thestatesman.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=343328&catid=37 (accessed October 21, 2010).

improving its response to ongoing flood relief.¹²³ Inversely, President Zardari has pushed against the military by attempting twice in the last year to pull the control of the Pakistani ISI under his executive office, but to no avail as the senior military leaders stopped such an injunction.¹²⁴ This is coupled with an Afghan and Pakistani government suspicions revolving around the Pakistani military's rogue employment of ISI operatives within both nations, further complicating their political-military relationship in Pakistan and Kabul's trust towards its neighbor. These examples of political-military fissures further add to the government's inability to gain a trusted Afghan partner and ultimately debilitate Pakistan.

The bid for power between these various Pakistani factions, with non-cooperative goals and wide varied visions of Pakistan's future, continues to provide social instability that directly influences Pakistani governance. Many of the chief complaints Kabul has with the Pakistan government, resulting from its political instability, are its allowance of a Taliban and Al Qaeda sanctuary, the perceived ISI support of terror groups that operate in Afghanistan, and rise of Islamic militancy in the Pakistani border region that has a spillover on their country.¹²⁵ Additionally, Pakistan's ineffective suppression of a ten billion dollar a year black market and the perception of them sponsoring Pashtun interests in Afghanistan further complicates their relationship.¹²⁶ These collective government and social fissures feed Pakistan's political internal instability that serves as a source of friction that to preclude a pro-Pakistan Kabul from evolving.

Pakistan's Desire for Economic Access

This section in the monograph will address Pakistan's economic relationship with Afghanistan and their quest for access into Afghan markets. It will also analyze the impacts of Indian, Iranian, and

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Shibil Siddiqi, "Obama's Surge and Pakistan," http://www.fpif.org/articles/obamas_surge_and_pakistan (accessed October 21, 2010).

¹²⁵ Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam*, 182-191.

¹²⁶ South Asia Monitor, "India and Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hostile Sports," *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, Number 117 (April 3, 2008): 2-3.

Chinese economic activities in and their attempts to gain further access in Afghanistan that is affecting Pakistan's economy.

Strategic Value of Afghanistan's Geographical Location as a Central Asian Crossroad on Pakistan

According to CIA economic researchers, "Pakistan, an impoverished and underdeveloped country, has suffered from decades of internal political disputes and low levels of foreign investment."¹²⁷ With a quarter of its population living below their standard poverty line, a 15.2% inflation rate, and a \$15.2 billion national debt, and a recovery from Summer 2010 flood that is projected cost upwards of \$20 billion, the Pakistani economy is facing a challenging future.¹²⁸ However, with a diverse economy that produces sophisticated products like fertilizers, textiles, and pharmaceuticals to simple goods like agriculture and clothing apparel, the economy has the potential to recover if delicately handled.¹²⁹

Historically, the Afghanistan and Pakistan markets have been mutually supportive of one another. Typically, Afghanistan provides agricultural food and cotton products, while Pakistan inversely exports raw metals and simple market commodities. Also, Afghani export and import trade is reliant on the utilization of the Pakistani port of Karachi (the port is a source of leverage when other countries want to trade with Afghanistan, as it currently provides the only port-to-overland access), which supports Pakistani's interest. Possessing Karachi, Pakistan controls India's full access to Afghan markets until the Iranian Chabahar seaport is open. While the Pakistani economy is influenced by Afghanistan, Pakistan can survive without it, although with some major discomfort. However, the Afghan economy, which last

¹²⁷ Central Intelligence Agency's The World Factbook, "South Asia: Pakistan," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>, updated on September 10, 2010, (accessed October 18, 2010).

¹²⁸ Amir Latif, "Strapped for cash, Pakistan has little power over US," *Global Post*, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/pakistan/101005/pakistan-economy-us-military-afghanistan-war>, (accessed October 18, 2010).

¹²⁹ Harsh Vivek, "India-Pakistan-Afghanistan Trade, India Development Foundation," www.idfresearch.org/safta2.ppt, (accessed October 18, 2010).

year reportedly exports 69% of its products to Pakistan for consumption (legal and black market), will more than likely implode without Pakistani market access.¹³⁰

The NATO war in Afghanistan has produced a number of unforeseen effects that plague both economies. There has been an increase in foreign investment in Afghanistan, specifically with Pakistan's rival India, which has resulted in extensive black market activities, increased poppy growth and a reduction of wheat productions. These adverse market affects are damaging the Pakistani economy, but will not bankrupt it.

Pakistani governmental and business leaders are attempting gain further economic access and bilateral trade agreements with Afghanistan. Additionally, they are attempting to inversely deny India further economic "strategic encirclement" of Pakistan. Pakistan's fear of India is not only militarily, but they also see India's access to Afghan markets could damage their trade with their neighbor. India's goods could conceivable replace Pakistan's current exports into Afghanistan, further economically destabilizing Pakistan to the point of an economic implosion.

However, on a positive note, in an unprecedented joint meeting between Presidents Karzai and Zardari on 15-16 September 2010, the two nation's leaders discussed then signed a joint mutual statement that outlined their increased cooperation in building a stronger bilateral cooperation between the nations. Out of the five major goals of the partnership, three of the joint agreements were to increase:

1. Economic cooperation, transit, trade and investment - Develop a joint approach to realizing enormous potential of bilateral economic, transit, trade, and investment cooperation.
2. Infrastructure development and connectivity - Focus on infrastructure development and railroad connectivity to complement economic, transit, trade and investment linkages.
3. Energy linkages - Develop a comprehensive strategy to promote energy sector cooperation and projects.¹³¹

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Presidential Statement, *Joint Statement between Pakistan and Afghanistan, on Strengthening the Partnership*, dated September 16, 2010,

These three collaborative goals between Afghanistan and Pakistan, if properly executed, will provide greater bilateral cooperation between the nations and will complimentarily build each state's economy.

Fight for Economics? Pakistan Versus India in the Afghan Arena

India's economic exploration in Afghanistan is having a multitude of negative effects on Pakistan. Their historical rivalry has led to an Indian pursuit of increased foreign investment and trade agreements between New Delhi and Kabul. Since the NATO invasion, India's foreign aid and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan have directly contributed to increased Pakistani inflation, as traditional imports of food crops to Pakistan were replaced by poppies for opium production and an increase in black-market activities that bypassing legal markets.¹³² The increase in opium production has skyrocketed wheat prices in Pakistan to twice their traditional market value.¹³³ Resulting from the vacuum provided from foreign aid, black-market activities is estimated to be \$10 billion in annual illegal trade is occurring between Afghanistan and Pakistan.¹³⁴ The negative effects of foreign aid and investment in Afghanistan not only further complicates the economic sphere in Afghan-Pakistan relations, but also affects their ability to maintain domestic security and effectively operate their governmental institutions.

In keeping with Pakistan's suspicion that India is attempting to gain strategic encirclement, not only militarily but also economically, India is purposefully deepening its economic ties with Afghanistan at the expense of Pakistan. The Pakistanis point to evidence that India is building a seaport in Chabahar, Iran and is refurbishing the connecting highway from the port to the Afghan city of Zaranj.¹³⁵ By the Indians' possessing a bilateral agreement to use the seaport facility on the Indian Ocean and road access

www.president.gov.af/.../JOINT_STATEMENT_BETWEEN_PAKISTAN_AND_AFGHANISTAN.pdf (accessed October 18, 2010).

¹³² South Asia Monitor, "India and Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hostile Sports," 2.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 2-3.

¹³⁵ Milani, "Iran's Policy Towards Afghanistan," 251-252.

into Western Afghanistan is strategically significant. This Iranian port will allow India and other nations to bypass the current Karachi-Kandahar route that facilitates the only efficient port-to-overland access to enter exported goods and services into Afghanistan.¹³⁶ This New Delhi-Tehran-Kabul trade alliance could economically disable or strangle Pakistan, especially if these nations collaborated to exercise sanctions against what they perceive as a hostile Pakistan to their interest in the region.

In addition, India's economic goals in Afghanistan include eventually gaining greater access into the CARs. Due to her increased requirement for energy resources, because of an explosive economy, India requires access to new energy resources to feed her growing economy.¹³⁷ An analysis of Indian economic activities in Afghanistan definitely demonstrates that their economic exploration is directly having a debilitating economic impact on Pakistan.

Impact of China on Pakistan's Economic Access into Afghanistan

One of China's major foreign policy goals in this region is to maintain strong relations with both Pakistan and Afghanistan that will serve its "strategic and economic security needs" and facilitates access into the CARs markets and oilfields.¹³⁸ Additionally, to complementarily parallel this objective is to do so while countering both U.S. and Indian influence in this economic crossroads of Central Asia.¹³⁹ With its exponential industrial growth over the last three decades, China's ever-increasing energy and raw resource requirements have climbed to an all time high, requiring China to gain access into new markets.

This industrial growth has strengthened China's interest to build trade agreements and recently lead to the Chinese \$3.5 billion investment in the Afghan Aynak copper fields.¹⁴⁰ This new Chinese

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ South Asia Monitor, "India and Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hostile Sports," 2.

¹³⁸ Bruce Riedel and Pavneet Singh, "U.S.-China Relations: Seeking Strategic Convergence in Pakistan," *Foreign Policy Paper Series*, Number 18 (January 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/0112_us_china_relations_riedel.aspx (accessed October 18, 2010).

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ron Synovitz, "China: Afghan Investment Reveals Larger Strategy," <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1144514.html> (accessed October 19, 2010).

foreign investment in Afghanistan has a generally positive impact on its neighbor Pakistan, as China is sponsoring the further development of the Pakistani deepwater seaport in Gwadar and increasing transit of overland goods through Pakistan into Afghanistan and the CARs. The Pakistanis have traditionally had a good foreign and economic relationship with the Chinese.¹⁴¹ The current assessment is that China's increased economic activities are both benefiting Afghanistan and Pakistan, and forecasted to have a rise in Chinese investment activities that benefit both nations.

Impact of Iran on Pakistan's Economic Access into Afghanistan

Iran's cultivation of an economic partnership with Kabul is one of Tehran's two major strategic objectives within Afghanistan. As government and international affairs professor Moshen Milani points out, Iran's goals in Afghanistan are to establish "an economic sphere of influence by engaging in reconstruction in Afghanistan" and "for Iran to become the hub for the transit of goods and services between the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, Central Asia, India and China."¹⁴² The effects of this relationship between the two nations on Pakistan are yet to be determined, however, bilateral economic relations between Pakistan and Iran have historically and recently remain relatively strong.¹⁴³

To meet her strategic economic goals with Afghanistan, Iran is heavily investing in infrastructure projects that go from major eastern Iranian cities into Afghanistan to give them a sense of economic operational reach into Afghan markets. By improving its infrastructure, such as roads, rail, and bridges, the Iranians will gain greater access to Afghan markets to deliver exported goods, thereby producing greater national income for the Iranians in the form of tariffs. The Indian sponsored seaport construction at Chabahar, with the complimentary Iranian reconstruction of a highway from the port facility into Afghanistan, could economically damage Pakistan. This overland road would provide greater access into Afghan and CAR markets, with an approximate 700 km shorter distance to travel in comparison to the

¹⁴¹ South Asia Monitor, "India and Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hostile Sports," 3.

¹⁴² Milani, "Iran's Policy Towards Afghanistan," page 235.

¹⁴³ Robert Frasco and Ariel Farrar-Wellman, "Pakistan-Iran Foreign Relations," http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/pakistan-iran-foreign-relations#_ftn14 (access October 18, 2010).

Karachi-Kandahar road that has a monopoly on major transit trade moving from the Indian Ocean port into Afghanistan.¹⁴⁴ While Iran may not be purposefully attempting to economically hurt Pakistan, in her economic exploration to gain greater access into Afghan markets, the potential adverse effects are yet to be realized and may, especially once the Chabahar port is operational, have a major impact on the Pakistani economy.

Synthesis of the Implications for the United States

Looking at the U.S. through a Pakistani Lens

Looking at the U.S. through a Pakistani lens, this section explores information and events that are affecting the United States' relationship with Pakistan. For a lasting peace to evolve the U.S., in her attempt to build an Afghanistan that can stand on its own feet, must continue to strategically involve Pakistan. It is critical that any U.S. strategy provides the means to build a comprehensive tri-lateral partnership between the U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan. When developing any strategy, it is imperative that the Americans recognize how Pakistan judges their actions in her neighborhood. Unpopular U.S. foreign policy decisions encompassing Pakistan reflects her population's popular opinion that the U.S. is a fair weather friend.¹⁴⁵ The American utilization of foreign aid to gain their support is insulting and her cross border unmanned aerial drone strikes in Pakistan paints America in a negative light.

Perceptions matter in any relationship, especially when it involves the West's interaction with Islamic nation-states. Adverse perceptions have derailed many West-East or Muslim-Non-Muslim negotiations and foreign policies, the Israeli interaction with her surrounding neighbors over the last half-century serves as a great example. To fully appreciate Pakistan's current negative impression of U.S. foreign policy towards her, former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley effectively reinforces by stating that, "the history of the relations between Pakistan and U.S. is complicated and ambiguous, largely due to Pakistani perceptions of past U.S. abandonment. Any new U.S. strategy for Pakistan has to be

¹⁴⁴ Milani, "Iran's Policy Towards Afghanistan," 251–252.

¹⁴⁵ A.Z. Hilali, *US-Pakistan Relationship* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005) 264-265.

considered against realistic expectations, which in turn, have to take due account of the long-standing, on the nature of factors that shape Pakistani strategic priorities and culture."¹⁴⁶ As the former Ambassador points out, the U.S. track-record as a Pakistan partner is rather dismissal.

In a July 2010, a recent Pew Research Poll showed that 59% of Pakistanis describe "the U.S. as an enemy, while just 11% say it is a partner."¹⁴⁷ Additionally, upwards of 65% of the population surveyed stated that they opposed the NATO war in their neighbor's country and want to see NATO troops depart Afghanistan immediately.¹⁴⁸ Even with these depressive statistics, the poll did find that 64% of Pakistanis do want better relations with the U.S, but one that emphasizes a mutual respect and cooperation with one another, as Pakistani's feel America is conveniently using her when the U.S. needs her help in regional affairs.¹⁴⁹ As the U.S. attempts to overcome these negative perceptions of American abandonment, it is imperative that the U.S. realize that she will be judged with a jaundiced eye until she builds Pakistani trust through positive political actions. Ultimately, the U.S. has left a lot of foreign policy scar tissue on Pakistan that she has to calculate into her current foreign policy strategies.

The U.S. has historically leveraged foreign aid as a means to gain Pakistani support. During the 1980s when she supported the mujahedin against the Soviets, the U.S. passed the Pressler Amendment in an attempt to control Pakistan's nuclear weapons procurement and to facilitate the movement of monetary funding and military equipment transfers to support the jihad against the communist invaders.¹⁵⁰ Upon the Soviet withdrawal, the U.S. ceased funding a much reliant and American aid-dependent Pakistan. Essentially, the U.S. packed up shop and proverbially went home, leaving an impression of abandonment at a critical time when Afghanistan was in utter chaos and the effects were directly spilling into Pakistan.

¹⁴⁶ Robert B. Oakley and Franz-Stefan Gady, "Idolization by Choice: ISI and the Pakistani Army," *Institute for National Strategic Studies*, Number 247 (October 2009): abstract page.

¹⁴⁷ Pew Research Center. "America's Image Remains Poor: Concern About Extremist Threat Slips in Pakistan," released July 29, 2010, <http://pewglobal.org/2010/07/29/concern-about-extremist-threat-slips-in-pakistan/> (accessed on October 23, 2010).

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ A.Z. Hilali, 233-236.

The recent failure to pass the Biden-Luger Bill, which would have provided \$7.5 billion of foreign aid over a 5-year span and failed to ratify as a result of U.S. Congressional bipartisanship, made another impression that the U.S. was attempting to once again buy off Pakistan.¹⁵¹ Many Pakistanis see this diplomatic maneuvering as another American attempt to bribe their government to support the fight against Al Qaeda and their countrymen¹⁵² in what some recognize as a U.S. “Global War on Islam.”¹⁵³ All this done at Pakistan’s expense with increased domestic violence and debilitating economic strain, only to be abandoned again once NATO forces withdraw from Afghanistan.

The highly unpopular U.S. unmanned aerial drone attacks on sovereign Pakistani soil is causing a backlash that is perpetuating the population’s disgust for the U.S. and overtly appears to them to be another American pompous act.¹⁵⁴ It feeds their perception that America as a unilateral world bully, doing as it pleases, with no international repercussions. On September 30, 2010, U.S. attack helicopters crossed into Pakistani airspace and inadvertently killed two Pakistani soldiers they thought were militants. The Pakistanis population turned out in large demonstrations and their central government shut down the only main NATO logistical route, which runs from Karachi into Afghanistan, in protest of this direct violation to their sovereignty.¹⁵⁵ Additionally fueling the protests were the other 21 recorded drone

¹⁵¹ Shaun Tandon, “US takes up Pakistan Military Wish-List,” http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h4AAOZkk_6ZTRu5gtOLs6A6w4goA?docId=CNG.ffd85bba5977b7ef2a0db3ae2772957c.241 (accessed October 25, 2010). The US Congress last year approved a five-year, 7.5 billion-dollar package for Pakistan aimed at building schools, infrastructure and democratic institutions in hopes of denting the appeal of Islamic extremists.

¹⁵² Many Pakistanis refer to the innocent people, mostly Pashtuns, being killed by the U.S. unmanned aerial strikes as their countrymen, even if they are originally Afghan refugees. Additionally, some portions of the Pakistan population see the Afghan Taliban, TTP, and other “militant” groups as Islamic freedom fighters.

¹⁵³ Moin Ansari, “Obama’s Endless War on Islam,” <http://pakalert.wordpress.com/2009/05/28/obamas-endless-war-on-islam/> (accessed November 17, 2010).

¹⁵⁴ Daya Gamage, “U.S. Unmanned Drone attacks within Pakistan record high: Threat to Civilians,” *Asian Times*, <http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2010/10/03/us-unmanned-drone-attacks-within-pakistan-record-high-threat-civilians> (accessed October 28, 2010).

¹⁵⁵ Sebastian Abbot, “NATO: U.S. Helicopter Attack That Killed Pakistani Soldiers ‘A Mistake,’” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/06/nato-us-helicopter-attack_n_753079.html (accessed October 23, 2010).

missile strikes that month within Pakistan.¹⁵⁶ Since President Obama has taken office, the U.S. has substantially increased their utilization of these tactics to kill militants seeking refuge in Pakistan, increasing the division between the two nations.¹⁵⁷ Cross border attacks, such as these, encourage Pakistani hatred and suspicion of U.S. intentions in their region. Also gravely important are the second order effects of these attacks, as they serve as a source of embarrassment for the Pakistani central government. The population's opinion of their political leaders is damaged by these attacks, as it appears either they cannot prevent the U.S. from doing what they will in their country or they are covertly supporting the U.S. in these attacks. As former TTP leader, Baitullah Mehsud reveals the unintended consequences of unmanned aerial drone attacks that ultimately support his insurgent efforts, "I spent three months trying to recruit and only got 10-15 persons. One U.S. attack and I got 150 volunteers!"¹⁵⁸ U.S. tactics in theater must be cautious to not produce what counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen describes as "accidental guerrillas," by doing something on the surface that appears tactically logical, but in reality leads to the disenfranchised population being further isolated from their government and swayed to support or join the insurgency.¹⁵⁹ The U.S. utilization of unmanned aerial strikes needs further reevaluation to determine if the reward of killing a limited number of militants outweighs the damage to U.S. support in the region and is counter-productive in attempting to achieve their strategic goals in Afghanistan.

Recommendations for U.S. Strategies and Policies that are Mutually Supporting

This section of the monograph will present a handful of recommendations for consideration in future U.S. strategies and policies that mutually support both countries in their collective efforts during

¹⁵⁶ Munir Ahmed, "Pakistan probes reports of Qaida militant's death," <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huffwires/20100929/as-pakistan/> (accessed October 1, 2010).

¹⁵⁷ Gamage, "U.S. Unmanned Drone attacks within Pakistan record high: Threat to Civilians."

¹⁵⁸ Shuja Nawaz, "FATA – A Most Dangerous Place," *Center for Strategic & International Studies* (January 2009): 18.

¹⁵⁹ David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 28-38.

this challenging era of persistent conflict. The research brings to the surface that any U.S. comprehensive regional strategy must genuinely partner with Pakistan, the strategy has to address issues associated with the Pakistan-India friction, builds economic ties across the region for the benefit of all nations involved, and takes action to eliminate or reduce the negative perceptions of U.S. influence in the region.

On 27 March 2009, President Obama unveiled his new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan (AF-PAK Strategy). The strategy has been met with equally supportive and negative comments surrounding the U.S. strategy that is supposed to lead to enduring change and meet with a core end state that “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.”¹⁶⁰ Holistically, the AF-PAK Strategy is fairly sound in the strategy context as it attempts to apply a whole of government approach to addressing the multitude of issues associated with this region. The execution of this almost two-year old strategy, however, has met many challenges associated with the complexity of this region that are highlighted throughout the monograph. It is recommended that a comprehensive two-year strategic review be conducted of the goals laid out in President Obama’s AF-PAK Strategy. The comprehensive review must verify if published strategic goals are being met and if not, determine if those objectives should be eliminated or what future adjustments should be incorporated to achieve the stated Presidential goals. Most importantly, this review must ascertain what additional strategies and policies need to be implemented to the existing AF-PAK Strategy or if a revision of the current strategy is required, then what new policies should be instituted in the revised version of the AF-PAK Strategy.

In addition or in a revised AF-PAK Strategy, the U.S. must take additional comprehensive measures and policies that strengthen the U.S.-Pakistan-Afghan nexus. These measures include the U.S. genuinely making Pakistan a trusted partner in building an independent Afghanistan. On 22 October 2010, Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani stated after a diplomatic conference he is supportive in such an

¹⁶⁰ Office of the U.S. President, *White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan*, posted on March 27, 2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/03/27/A-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/> (accessed November 22, 2010).

effort as, “Pakistan is part of the solution to Afghan issue and not the problem.”¹⁶¹ Without a clear appreciation for the importance of including Pakistan in a collective effort to stabilize Afghanistan, and their perception of the importance of their inclusion in this endeavor, the U.S. is doomed to fail to achieve their strategic goals in Afghanistan and may only weaken regional dynamics to the point of instigating a conflict. Not including Pakistan in the stabilization process will be perceived as either an insult or a threat and their support will be withdrawn to assist NATO efforts in Afghanistan.

Future strategies must continue to pursue enduring tri-lateral diplomatic, security and economic agreements between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the U.S. The aggregate progress the U.S. has made since the Afghan invasion is respectable, but slow at best. In many regards, the U.S.’s strategies have been ill-conceived as a result of not holistically understanding the complexities of this region and have generally concentrated on the tactical-level of the war. Well-known American strategist Anthony Cordesman reinforced this statement in his report *The Afghan War at the End of 2009*. Cordesman stated that NATO and the U.S. “were still focusing on tactical clashes” and “failed to focus on practical plans, schedules for action, needs for resources, and metrics for success.”¹⁶² A formally signed tri-lateral agreement or treaty is required to provide realistic and attainable objectives that facilitate trust through open and honest political dialogue, and incorporates the strategic means to build regional security and economic cooperation. Additionally, the plan must promote either a joint foreign policy agreement or concessions with major regional actors like India and Iran. Doing so will reduce regional friction and mitigate their potential attempts to derail this strategy. Central Asia is historically a delicate balance of power between nations that are competing for regional military superiority and economic prosperity at the expense of other nations. An appreciation for this balance of power must be compensated for in a new comprehensive approach to Central Asia, to either support U.S. goals or an ignorance of these regional

¹⁶¹ Associated Press of Pakistan, “Pakistan must part of negotiation process: PM,” http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=119874&Itemid=1 (accessed October 23, 2010).

¹⁶² Anthony Cordesman, “The Afghan War at the End of 2009: A Crisis and New Realism,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies* (January 4, 2010), 3.

dynamics will backfire into a scenario resulting in further threats to U.S. security and economic interests at home and abroad.

Within a formal tri-lateral agreement, the U.S. has to take reasonable diplomatic measures to assist Pakistan in addressing the malicious influences that are destabilizing her country. Reinforcing this, LTG(R) Barno testified that, “the U.S. must assist Pakistan in managing change - economically, militarily, perhaps even societally - as it deals with immense problems brought about by a deadly combination of both internal and external factors.”¹⁶³ Pakistan yearns for a strong and genuine partnership with the U.S., but it is up to America to set the conditions for this partnership through a proposed tri-lateral agreement. A positive sign that Pakistan is willing to participate in such a cooperative relationship was recently demonstrated in recent Afghan and Pakistani governmental talks. Prime Minister Gilani stated at a press conference that, “We have signed on to a joint vision for our two countries [Afghanistan and Pakistan] and the region, one that places primacy on economic development.”¹⁶⁴ This statement demonstrates a positive step forward, and an inclusive regional policy approach that exploits the two nation’s joint vision in economic development, which will both strengthen Central Asia markets and lead to America’s stated goal of achieving an enduring U.S.-Pakistan-Afghan nexus.

The U.S.-Pakistan-Afghan partners need to collectively develop a joint reconciliation and reintegration program that will bring their enemies to the negotiation table to facilitate bringing them back into the societal mainstream. Approximately a third of all counterinsurgency wars have tended to culminate in some form of reconciliation or negotiation with the insurgency.¹⁶⁵ This reconciliation process has to be thoroughly thought out and include Pakistan in the planning process, as much of the Afghan insurgency uses Pakistan as a base of support to recruit, provide sanctuary, ideological

¹⁶³ LTG(R) David W. Barno, Near East Asia Center for Strategic Studies Director, Senate Armed Services Committee Testimony, on February 26, 2009, 9.

¹⁶⁴ Associated Press of Pakistan, “Pakistan must part of negotiation process: PM.”

¹⁶⁵ Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki. *How Insurgencies End* (Santa Monica: RAND Publishing, 2010), 18.

motivation, resupply and to fund their insurgent efforts.¹⁶⁶ In an October 2010 press conference, Prime Minister Gilani reinforced this: “Without involving Pakistan, any negotiation process cannot be succeeded.”¹⁶⁷ The Prime Minister echoed that reconciliation is important to stabilizing both nations and that Pakistan will fully support this effort. However, he concluded that this process has to be initiated by Afghanistan, and if done properly, the “efforts will ensure peace and security in the region.”¹⁶⁸

Where appropriate, the U.S. needs to selectively assist in building regional economic bridges across Central Asia for the benefit of those involved to gain cooperative economic partnerships that would inevitably bring greater security and political cooperation. Central Asian nations have the economic potential to prosper from such an activity, if they can put aside their historical differences, and build a market interdependency that could eventually rival the European Union. For example, a U.S. mediated kick-start of the stalled Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline initiative could serve as an economic forcing function that would not only provide mutually supporting oil resources and trade amongst these nations, but would serve as a medium to further increase credible strategic dialogue and agreements that would solidify region stability and security. Additionally, the U.S. would have to be sensitive and breakdown any misperception of America picking favorites between Afghanistan-Pakistan-India in any economic partnership. Lastly, the U.S. must not punish these nations if they engage in dialogue with either Iran or China, as it would possible backfire on the U.S. in their partnership. The U.S. has the ability to coach and mediate such important economic initiatives to the point of bringing greater economic interdependence and regional security.

Strategically important, the U.S. has to address the implications of its adverse perception in this region. The negative opinion of U.S.-led operations and foreign policies in this region are leaving an unfavorable impression and further destabilizing the nations that interact with them. Specifically in Pakistan, the U.S. needs to target Pakistani public perception of their intentions in the region and the idea

¹⁶⁶Commander International Security Forces Afghanistan, “Initial Assessment Report,” 2-10.

¹⁶⁷ Associated Press of Pakistan, “Pakistan must part of negotiation process: PM.”

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

of the U.S. is using Pakistan to ultimately abandon her again, as it did previously in 1989. A rise in Pakistani popular opinion of the U.S. will relieve pressure on both the U.S. and Pakistani governments, may reduce militant recruitment, and can potentially lead to the kind of relationship the nations can exploit to support their mutual interest.

Lastly, in the complexity of the modern asymmetrical battlefields the U.S. has been fighting on since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government needs to reexamine their definition of “victory” or “winning” in Afghanistan to ensure it is realistic, achievable, and supportable by the people who they intend to help in this region. To reach the conditions of a “victory” in Afghanistan will undoubtedly involve the support of Pakistan in reaching that end-state. For this victory to be achieved in Afghanistan, LTG(R) David Barno, in his February 2009 Senate Armed Service Committee testimony, reinforced that a “win” would have to incorporate Pakistani support.¹⁶⁹ He further elaborated that the conditions in Pakistan to reach this victory would look like a, “Pakistan stabilized as a long term partner that is economically viable, friendly to the United States, no longer an active base for international terrorism and in control of its nuclear weapons.”¹⁷⁰ While it may currently be difficult to define what victory truly looks like in this challenging region, the U.S. must define what a “win” will look like and communicate it to the American population and the greater international community to ensure their support, so they know what the cost of their treasure in money and lives will ultimately yield.

Conclusion

Pakistan’s security, political and economic dynamics cannot be fully understood without considering the implications of its history and the current regional complexities it shares with their neighbors. What drives Pakistan's interest in Afghanistan? The research and analysis have determined that Pakistan’s existential interest in controlling Afghanistan is foremost to ensure their security. The fundamental requirement for national security, whether from external or domestic threats, is the linchpin

¹⁶⁹ Barno, Senate Armed Services Committee Testimony.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

to ensuring their very existence as a nation-state. As Benazir Bhutto vehemently stated, “the security issue for Pakistan is an issue of survival.”¹⁷¹ Haunted by turbulent history since its inception, Pakistan has always had the issue of security primarily at the center of its political strategies and has served to form a nationalistic mantra to unite its citizens in a patriotic fervor against perceived external threats. As Karman Shafi, a highly respected Pakistani political analyst and journalist, eloquently summarizes what Pakistan’s future should be, “The way forward is to befriend all the Afghan people: northerners, southerners, Pashtun and Uzbek and Hazara, Sunni and Shia. *To be the elder brother to Afghanistan*, rather than its manipulator. We must also ask ourselves whether our last involvement in Afghanistan was good for that country or for Pakistan.”¹⁷² Without security, Pakistan will not be able to achieve the economic growth and political reform that it requires to achieve its vision of being a major global leader.

For Pakistan to achieve this enduring security, that facilitates them increasing their economic and political influences worldwide, there must be an open and credible strategic dialogue with both Afghanistan and NATO to achieve a collective diplomatic agreement that delivers a cooperative partnership that builds a positive future. In addition to this strategic dialogue, parallel negotiations must occur with India and Iran that leads to cooperative concessions, if not formal treaties or agreements, to mitigate their negative influences on Pakistan that may arise from those country’s relationship with Afghanistan. This would greatly reduce the regional friction between these collective nations, which historically benefits no specific country. By abiding on the agreed terms of their negotiations, it may lead to an unprecedented regional stability and economic prosperity for all involved. Most important to these extensive regional agreements is addressing the elimination or reconciliation and reintegration of militants that are destabilizing the collective group. For Pakistan to prove to their neighbors that they are a credible regional partner, they have to immediately take steps to eliminate all direct and indirect support, to

¹⁷¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, “Intimations of Multipolarity,” <http://www.wiphala.org/waltz25.htm> (accessed September 21, 2010), 13.

¹⁷² Kamran Shafi, “Putting on a Brave Face and Standing Tall,” <http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/columnists/kamran-shafi-putting-on-a-brave-face-and-standing-tall-480> (accessed September 10, 2010).

include sanctuary, to militant extremists in their nation. Specifically, these militant and terror groups include those launching attacks from Pakistan into Afghanistan, the Kashmir region, and into India.

Whereas for India to build their credibility with Pakistan, they need to cease any further support to elements that threaten Pakistan's internal security, like the various Balochistan insurgent groups, and not to solely pursue a strategic relationship with Afghanistan at the expense of Pakistan's security. A threat of Indian strategic encirclement will only continue to feed Pakistan's 60-year old paranoia of India's pursuit to destroy their nation. Mutual concessions or a formal treaty between Pakistan and India is crucial to set the foundation for an enduring regional security. Pakistan needs to demonstrate to India the benefits of a cooperative relationship, that includes Afghanistan, and the potential benefits to their already exploding economy – demonstrating to India that the strategic risks in such an agreement is worth their economic gain. Further, they must comprehend the reality that a weak and fragmented Pakistan is not beneficial for India, as the conditions would support an increase in terrorism and regional Islamic militancy that would attack her interests abroad and at home. Additionally, a destabilized Pakistan government and military would put the question of her nuclear weapons security in jeopardy. With catastrophic effects, India would not be able to escape the fallout of an imploding Pakistan.

Political leaders and military strategists must understand the historical impressions that currently impact the regional dynamics described in this monograph to fully appreciate Pakistan's existential security interests associated with an Afghanistan neighbor. Their western neighbor directly affects Pakistan's security, internal political function and economy. Failure to understand these complexities could lead the United States into a failed NATO strategy in Afghanistan, a debunked U.S.-Pakistan-Afghan partnership, and worse case, a regional war between the two nuclear states of Pakistan and India.

Acronyms

AF-PAK	Afghanistan-Pakistan
AQ	Al Qaeda
CAR	Central Asia Republics
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan)
FOB	Forward Operating Base
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ISI	Inter-Service Intelligence (Pakistan)
JD	Jamaat Ud Dawa (Pakistani Terror Group)
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Pakistani Terror Group)
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba (Pakistani Terror Group)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NWFP	Northwest Frontier Province (Pakistan)
RAW	Research & Analysis Wing (Indian)
TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban (Pakistani Insurgent Group)
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
U.S.	United States
USIP	United States Institute for Peace

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